BACKGROUND: Afghanistan\'s greatest historical challenge in the modern era has been establishing effective centralized administrative systems. The rugged Hindu Kush rises up in the center of the country, creating a \"ring\" of major economic hubs and arable regions. This ring system, by its very shape, acts to discourage centralization around one administrative hub. Kabul is in many ways just as peripheral to Afghanistan as Herat, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif or Kandahar. This geographical problem is compounded by a diverse ethnography, and sustained patterns of invasion and great power interference. The December 2003 Constitution is not the first attempt to create centralized administrative systems in Afghanistan. It has been tried in various forms from the periods of British occupation through to the Communists and the Taliban. These efforts have consistently triggered violent backlashes against the central government. Herat, because of its relative strength, distance from the capital, and geostrategic importance has been a source of frustration for those who have tried to consolidate centralized rule around Kabul-- either through imperial or domestic impulses. In the 19th Century, Herat was a persistent source of resistance to British-Afghan centralization efforts. A Herat-based force led by Ayub Khan routed the British at Maiwand in 1880. The city spent most of the century balancing, challenging, and drifting between Kabul and Tehran\'s spheres of influence. It was besieged or occupied twice by the Persians and \"recaptured\" by Kabul-based forces twice between 1836 and 1881, with each move factoring centrally in the Anglo-Russian struggle for dominance in Central Asia. With a 1500-man armed presence now on the ground in Herat, Kabul once again finds itself in the familiar position of trying to reign in its most independent-minded province. Having put down Nayebzadah\'s revolt and received assurances of non-involvement from the small U.S. garrison in Herat, Ismail Khan is weighing his next move. Though forces loyal to him in Herat easily outnumber the Kabul contingent, any action against them will force an open conflict with the central government, something that both sides have sought to avoid. The Kabul force, for its part, has taken up positions in the barracks where Nayebzadah\'s soldiers resided.

IMPLICATIONS: This crisis has struck at a bad moment for the Governor of Herat. Other challenges have appeared on Ismail Khan\'s flanks: to the Northeast in Baghdis province (where, incidentally, Nayebzadah is said to have sought refuge), a long-simmering conflict with the local governor has flared up once again, and Ismail Khan\'s soldiers are reported to have been involved in engagements. To the South, Farah province remains the only part of the Western Region where opium gangs and Taleban-like elements control much of two districts. His relations with the international NGOs in the region has also been tense Yet it is the pressure from the central government (and by extension the U.S.-led Coalition) that weighs most heavily on Ismail Khan. Following the violence of March 21, the situation remains extremely tense. Ismail Khan, grieving the loss of his son and rattled by the attempt on his own life, is now faced with the most serious challenge to his power in Herat since the Taliban captured the city in 1995. Khan has proven his ability to run effective insurgencies, and though he does not enjoy the popular support he once had, he nonetheless maintains strong relationships throughout the West. Also factoring into the equation are Khan\'s links with Iran, and his credentials as a \"true\" Islamic Revolutionary. Ismail Khan deserves a great deal of the criticism that has been levelled at him by both the international community and Karzai\'s government. He has been accused of diverting tens of millions of dollars in customs revenues to private Swiss and German accounts. Human Rights groups have slammed him repeatedly over the past two years, largely over the status of women. Today Herat faces a suicide epidemic that is directly the product of his inability (or unwillingness) to work towards improving the basic condition of Herati women. Political opponents have been threatened, and aid agencies have been intimidated and looted. But Ismail Khan is not a typical warlord. He is extremely conservative, something of a bully, and has a long and storied history as a military commander. But Herat is a quiet place. Ismail Khan is not where he is today because of gangster qualities in a collapsed state, but emerged in an administrative vacuum on the heels of the Taleban retreat, bolstered by a strong base of popular support, and a nudge from both the Iranians and the Americans. Neither is Khan a nationalist. Though Heratis are fond of claiming a certain refined superiority over other Afghans, they bear their Afghan nationality with a characteristic pride. Khan\'s self-proclamation as the \"Emir of the West,\" should be read as more of an early attempt to define Herat\'s relationship with Kabul within Afghanistan than any kind of declaration of independence. A visitor to Kabul and Herat will immediately notice the gap in relative administrative capacities. Herat is visibly cleaner, more orderly, and safer than the capital, in spite of the latter\'s access to cash from international agencies.

CONCLUSIONS: Over time, as Afghanistan gets back on its feet and evidence of effective national governance emerges, Herat and Kabul will naturally grow closer together. In a perfect world, an equilibrium will evolve over time. The constitution and the national institutions that form around it will grow roots. But by forcing the issue at this point, Karzai risks provoking a much more serious crisis, and sending Afghanistan into yet another round of violence. Khan should be encouraged to participate in the democratic system, and to express his autonomous impulses through the mechanisms that exist in the constitution. But Kabul\'s recent move has shown that it still sees soldiers, not lawyers, as the solution. This reveals a degree of mistrust and discourages participative politics at a point when they need to be reinforced. The deployment in Herat is being spun by the government as a \"stabilization force\" intended to guarantee the safety of Herat\'s citizenry. This assertion ignores the obvious: Ismail Khan\'s Herat has been the safest and most prosperous province in the country since the fall of the Taleban. Kabul has now put that in jeopardy. And though Karzai has the right to demand more of Khan, the question is how quickly -and how forcefully- he should act. AUTHOR’S BIO: Sebastian Sosman is a SAIS Graduate who recently returned from working with a humanitarian NGO in Herat.