BACKGROUND: 47-year old Alu Alkhanov was Minister of Interior in Kadyrov’s government. A bureaucrat and former transport police chief, Alkhanov was, unlike Kadyrov, never an advocate of Chechnya’s independence. After Chechen fighters defeated the Russian forces in 1996, Alkhanov left Chechnya to work in the local police department of a small Russian village close to Ukraine. He returned to Chechnya when Russian forces entered Chechnya in 1999, and was appointed Minister of Interior in Ahmad Kadyrov’s Administration. Kadyrov and Alkhanov were both backed by Russia and the Kremlin. Their political agendas were similar: to crush armed groups (that is, the Chechen resistance), fight extremism and corruption, establish a market economy in Chechnya, counter unemployment (figures reach 70%) and use Chechen oil money, keeping it apart from the Russian general Budget, through increasing oil production from 2 million tons to 5 million tons yearly. This would add 3 billion rubles (US$100 million) to the Chechen treasury. Kadyrov made this demand, but it was never granted by Moscow until now. In addition, both men are from the Tiep tribe, which explains why Alkhanov, like Kadyrov, received 90% of votes in some areas where there are concentrations of members of their tribe. The last and most important similarity between the two is their adamant refusal to negotiate with the Chechen resistance. These similarities could be attributed to the fact that they both adopt the pro-Russian policy in Chechnya. Despite all this, there are basic disparities between them that are sure to impact the policies of Chechnya’s new pro-Russian president. As The Economist noted, “Mr. Alkhanov is a bureaucrat and policeman, not the mixture of politician, father figure, bandit and warlord that his late boss was, and which anyone hoping to pacify Chechnya by force would need to be.” In addition to that, Kadyrov was a religious person who represented “Official Islam” in Russia, sought legitimacy on that basis, and tried to play role in promoting Russia’s foreign policy in the Islamic world. Finally, he at least had a history with the resistance, unlike Alkhanov, who is completely opposed to independence and was never involved with the national movement.

IMPLICATIONS: These differences will play a major role in Alkhanov’s policies on three levels: his relationship with the Chechen resistance; his international relations and the global acceptance he receives; and finally, his relationship with Kadyrov’s son, Ramzan Kadyrov. His attitude on these issues will show whether his election will make a difference towards peace in Chechnya or not. His relationship with the Chechen resistance is clear from the statements made by the two parties. Alkhanov’s first statement after his election was that he thought it unlikely that he would hold negotiations with the separatist Chechen president and resistance leader Aslan Maskhadov, and said that granting Maskhadov any legitimacy is an “illusion”. On the other hand, the Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov has vowed that anyone succeeding Kadyrov will face the same fate. He stated in a special interview with Free Europe Radio that the elections were not legitimate and were conducted under occupation. His deputy, Ahmad Zakayev, compared the voting process to “a ghetto in Warsaw or a Stalin concentration camp.” It was never likely that Alkhanov – and with him Russia – would contemplate to deal with the Chechen resistance, which in its turn refuses to deal with a “collaborating” government. If anything, the tragic carnage at Beslan will close any such avenues for the foreseeable future. As for Alkhanov’s relationships internationally, the election received a lot of criticism from human rights organizations and non-government organizations, as was the case with the March 2002 elections which brought Kadyrov to power. As in 2002, 200, 000 out of the 587,000 registered voters are not alive. Other organizations said the elections were a sham and a travesty. The official election commission said that 24,000 of the Russian military cast their votes, while other unbiased observers said the number reached 80,000). Furthermore, U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher was skeptical about the elections and said they did not meet international standards. It will remain doubtful whether the West will grant legitimacy to a president who won in a questionable election process. This will undermine Alkhanov, and although Kadyrov went through the same thing, he used his religious credentials to gain the support of the Islamic World, as exemplified by his visit to Saudi Arabia. The third and most dangerous level is Alkhanov’s relationship with Ramzan Kadyrov, in reality the powerful man in the Republic thanks to his well-armed militias. Probably due to his young age, Russia made him Deputy Prime Minister instead of putting him on the ballot. Some suggest Alkhanov’s presidency may be simply superficial, pending Ramzan reaching the eligible age for the presidency of Chechnya. In his last visit, Putin made it a point to meet with Ramzan Kadyrov in confirmation of Russia’s reliance on him. In spite of sharing Moscow’s patronage and the same tribal origin, Alkhanov and Kadyrov Jr. may run into a conflict of interest over oil, as Chechnya’s oil revenues will – theoretically – go back to Chechnya rather than to the Federal treasury. Most of the corruption in Chechnya is based on oil deals. Moreover, Alkhanov will not be able to disarm Ramzan Kadyrov’s militias although he might desire to, having recently criticized Ramzan and his armed groups.

CONCLUSIONS: Based on the above-mentioned points, it does not seem that Alkhanov will offer any change to the current Russian policy. If anything, his election indicates a Russian persistence in the “Chechenization” the conflict. The zero-sum relationship between the resistance and this kind of government will witness repeated cycles of violence. Furthermore, the possibilities of conflict between Alkhanov and Kadyrov, Jr. do exist and could emerge. All this will have negative consequences on the state of a Republic torn by conflict over ever-diminishing resources due to the years of war Chechnya witnessed. It has become clear that Moscow’s “electoral solution” in Chechnya and persistent refusal to deal with the legitimate Chechen government represented by Aslan Maskhadov is going nowhere. It also seems that the interests of those who wish to sustain the no-peace, no-war situation, or in other words chaos, in Chechnya fit with this kind of elections. All indicators show that the course of conflict is moving towards escalation – not normalization or a search for real solutions to the conflict and its social and economic ramifications for civilians.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Murad Batal Al-Shishani is a Jordanian-Chechen writer who holds an M.A degree in Political Science, specializing in Islamic Movements in Chechnya. He is author of the book \"Islamic Movement in Chechnya and the Chechen-Russian Conflict 1990-2000”, Amman 2001 (in Arabic).