BACKGROUND: U.S. interests in the South Caucasus include thanking both Georgia and Azerbaijan, the only Muslim country with forces in Iraq, for their support of the U.S. invasion there. But much more is at stake than expressions of gratitude. Rumsfeld clearly aims to strengthen the U.S. military programs to train and equip the Georgian Army, which evidently were extended owing to his conversations with Saakashvili, and to defend Azerbaijan’s coastline. These programs provide the basis for future bilateral or multilateral cooperation of these armies with the U.S. military or with NATO. They are also the centerpiece of any hope for reform of Georgia’s defense structures, a prerequisite for realizing the regime’s great goal of inclusion in NATO. Rumsfeld’s discussions with Saakashvili undoubtedly worked out the modalities of continuing this program and ensuring its funding. Rumsfeld and his colleagues at the State Department also evidently were instrumental in persuading Georgia to resume work on the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which had been stopped due to environmental concerns. Work was only resumed after high-ranking State Department officials personally vouched for its environmental security and steps were taken to allay Georgian concerns. But it is also possible that the threat of the suspension of the pipeline’s construction was used to induce the United States to support Georgia’s position in the dispute with Russia over South Ossetia. Undoubtedly this crisis also lay at the center of Rumsfeld\'s discussions. While Colin Powell called for mediation of the crisis, both Tbilisi and Moscow regularly appear to be acting in ways that alternate provocation and moderation, and not always in well thought out ways. On both sides, there has been plenty of bellicose rhetoric, coupled with local acts of violence and covert Russian attempts at violence or support for separatists that were, as is almost always the case, found out, which only inflamed matters further.

IMPLICATIONS: Georgia is already spending millions that it can ill afford on weapons. Whether this spending is for defense against Russian or Russian-supported forces or is intended to threaten separatists, it appears that only through Washington\'s facilitation of negotiation is a peaceful resolution possible. This fact underscores the centrality of the U.S. presence in the area to the preservation of peace and America’s beneficial impact upon the habitually tense Russo-Georgian relationship. But secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell’s intervention also underscores the need for Moscow and Tbilisi to avoid provocative and poorly conceived actions that may play well at home but lead to an irretrievable tragedy for all parties. And, in fact, we cannot count on either actor to avoid the temptation to score quick or cheap points that only escalate tensions further. Azerbaijan also presents problems for Washington, not least because of the stalemated war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh which shows no sign of coming closer to political resolution even as Aliyev’s government ratchets up the belligerent rhetoric and play to the large refugee population in Azerbaijan. Increasing numbers of people in Baku feel that despite all the help it has given Washington, America has not helped provide an answer to the problem. This view overlooks the fact that without a decent army of its own Azerbaijan cannot compel Armenia to yield, and goes hand in hand with the dangerous stimulation of belligerent rhetoric that the Aliyev government has fostered. But at the same time both Iran and Russia oppose extension of Baku’s military collaboration with Washington and if America cannot help Azerbaijan with Armenia, Aliyev may feel he has no choice but to turn to those two countries for help. After all, both also dispose of formidable means of inciting internal unrest inside Azerbaijan and have not shrunk from doing so in the past. That potential leverage is obviously another reason for Aliyev to harken to them rather than Washington. Certainly Iran has in the past tried not just to restrict and curtail America’s military presence but also to incite agitation for an Islamic regime there. Moscow has played at coups against the governments in Baku that have ruled since 1991, including that of Aliyev’s late father, Heydar Aliyev, and remains the nearest great power even if some analysts charge that a subterranean Irano-Russian rivalry is taking place and that Tehran believes that Russia is in long-term retreat. Undoubtedly Aliyev and his government seek the kind of assistance that Washington has given Georgia in defending its sovereignty against Russia as well as more tangible assistance against Armenia. But failing to get it, Aliyev has turned to Russia, China, and Pakistan for support. Islamabad has previously promised defense cooperation, i.e. arms sales and training for Azeri officers. China also provides such training and has improved its defense and energy profile in Azerbaijan by also buying into Azeri oil projects. Thus Rumsfeld apparently hurriedly included Azerbaijan in his itinerary of trips to Oman, Afghanistan, Russia, and Ukraine. Rumsfeld’s talks with Aliyev ostensibly revolved around issues of defense or security cooperation between Baku and Washington, which may also include a potential base for U.S. forces down the road. But there is good reason to believe that pressure is also building upon Washington to launch an initiative to unblock the frozen status quo regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. Washington may be the only capital that has the means to launch such an initiative and the credibility to see it through, but that is by no means a foregone conclusion. Neither is the success of any American initiative to be taken for granted because there are so many factors and actors who might act individually or conspire to frustrate any American initiative.

CONCLUSIONS: All signs of growing U.S. involvement as a critical actor and security manager for the area indicate the depth of America’s interests, and involvement in the South Caucasus and the fact that this involvement could lead to further entanglements, if not causes for estrangement, with Tehran, Moscow and other capitals. Now that Washington has become a legitimate security manager for the South Caucasus, if not the premier foreign player there, it must reckon with all the dimensions of this region’s security dilemmas and agendas. Nobody should think that these can be anything other than long-term and protracted responsibilities. Rumsfeld’s visit, not the first he made to this area, will probably not be the last made by him or by future Secretaries of Defense and State. Washington is in the Caucasus to stay, but it is not clear whether it can do better than all those who have tried in the past to master the region and who would gladly try to supplant it today.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department, or the US Government.