BACKGROUND: When appointed prime minister of Azerbaijan in August 2003, Ilham Aliyev pledged to work with his father’s team. In the short run, at least, he has kept his word. The unification of the ruling elite around Ilham Aliyev prevented the fragmentation of the ruling New Azerbaijan party (YAP) and made a relatively smooth transition from former President Heydar Aliyev’s era into his son’s possible. Many international and domestic observers nevertheless expected that once elected to the presidency, Ilham Aliyev would bring his own cadre, typically younger, reform-minded individuals many of which have western education, to key governmental positions. In the past nine months, this process lagged behind expectations, as President Aliyev only made generally welcomed replacements of the ministers of communication and foreign affairs, and second-tier officials. This reflected, among other things, Azerbaijan’s difficult and complex political landscape. Many started speculating that Aliyev is too dependent on his father’s team and lacks the political power to replace it. But last month’s sacking of influential Minister of National Security Namik Abbasov and his replacement with Ilham Aliyev’s dynamic younger loyalist and former coordinator of national efforts to combat trafficking, Eldar Mahmudov, indicated a shift of priorities and showed Aliyev’s commitment to the gradual cadre change policy. Furthermore, in accordance with Azerbaijani traditions, it has been deemed unlikely that Aliyev is going to make sharp moves until the one-year anniversary of his father’s death. The gradual replacement of the conservative “old guard” has put many influential members of the ruling elite under pressure. Lately, the rivalry and open confrontation among the members of the ruling party have intensified. YAP has been known for its internal rivalries for many years, as several competing groupings were united under the authority of former President Heydar Aliyev. Yet after Heydar Aliyev’s death, intrigues within the party have taken an open form. Earlier this year, several pro-governmental media outlets launched an attack against the Mayor of Baku, Hajibala Abutalibov, and the Ministers of Education and Health, Misir Mardanov and Ali Insanov, respectively. These officials were said to be the political rivals of the Head of the Presidential Administration Ramiz Mehtiyev, which prompted many people to believe that Mehtiyev had been behind the media accusations. Later on, there were articles directed against Mehtiyev himself. In addition to this, former mayor of Baku Rafael Allahverdiyev launched an attack against Mehtiyev and Abutalibov in the past several weeks, accusing them of corruption and disloyalty against President Aliyev. He went as far as saying that some members of the ruling party had been preparing a coup d’état against the President. These allegations received an immediate answer from Minister of the Internal Affairs Ramil Usubov, who said: “Who can carry out a coup? Nobody. There is no such force in Azerbaijan.”

IMPLICATIONS: As the ruling elite gets engaged in a more overt rivalry for the re-distribution of political and economic influence in the country, President Aliyev will continue facing an increasing challenge of maintaining the balance of power between the competing groupings and refreshing the administration at the same time. On the one hand, he is following a careful approach of not upsetting all members of his father’s administration at the same time. This is done in order to maintain stability in Azerbaijan and to avoid the creation of a new, more well-financed opposition in the face of the sacked ministers. Past experience shows that some of the sacked notoriously corrupt members of the ruling party, like former speaker of Parliament Rasul Guliyev, moved on to finance a political struggle against the regime. For this reason, President Aliyev needs to play a safe game. At the same time, it is clear by now that President Aliyev will bring more and more of his own loyalists and younger reformers to power, probably more so after the Parliamentary elections of 2005, which are expected to change the composition of the conservative-dominated legislature. This makes some older members of the ruling party unhappy and nervous. They feel that they served the elder Aliyev loyally and that now, younger protégés of the new President are eager to push them aside. A redistribution of political and economic influence is indeed taking place in the country, as indicated by pressure on the business interests of some of the members of the ruling elite. This puts members of the “old guard” in a defensive position. Media outlets have recently reported that some of the members of the “old team” have met privately to develop a strategy of creating a new party, which will unite sacked or unhappy members of the ruling elite. One way President Aliyev may prevent the fragmentation of the ruling party is to keep the sacked ministers in the loop of the ruling elite by appointing them to the honorary positions, such as ambassador or president of a university. This was done with former minister of foreign affairs Vilayet Guliyev, for example. Others might be prevented from joining the opposition by threats of prosecution on charges of corruption. On the other hand, the new President, whose leadership style is less dominant than his father’s, may benefit from the elite’s internal rivalries, which provide the system with greater dynamism and himself with more room for maneuver.

CONCLUSIONS: President Ilham Aliyev’s power is still in the process of consolidation and in many ways, he still relies on the members of his father’s administration. From this perspective he can not afford to spoil relations with all of them at the same time. Nevertheless, he seems committed to cadre changes in the country and will probably replace several more ministers by the end of the year. Maintaining Azerbaijan’s stability will remain his first priority, however. At the same time, President Aliyev will have to continue to play a balancing game between the fractions of the ruling party, at least until parliamentary elections.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Fariz Ismailzade is a freelance writer on Caucasus politics and economics. He has obtained his masters degree from the Washington University in St. Louis and is currently based in Baku.