Wednesday, 20 October 2004

A STRONG JAPANESE INITIATIVE IN CENTRAL ASIA

Published in Analytical Articles

By S. Frederick Starr (10/20/2004 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND:In late August Japan unveiled a major new initiative with respect to the five countries of Central Asia formed after the collapse of the USSR. Since 1992 Japan has pursued an active if low-keyed policy of supporting economic and social development in the new states of Central Asia. Down to 2002 it had allocated a total of $2.
BACKGROUND:In late August Japan unveiled a major new initiative with respect to the five countries of Central Asia formed after the collapse of the USSR. Since 1992 Japan has pursued an active if low-keyed policy of supporting economic and social development in the new states of Central Asia. Down to 2002 it had allocated a total of $2.36 billion US in grants, technical cooperation, and loans to the region, including $915 million to Kazakhstan, $909 million to Uzbekistan, $345 million to the Kyrgyz Republic, $54 million to Tajikistan and $55 million to Turkmenistan. It has supported 2,600 trainees in Japan and sent out 1,100 experts and volunteers from Japan to the region. Its 1997 Silk Road Diplomacy Program organized these and other programs under a single umbrella of bilateral relations with each country. Now it has stepped up that engagement with an intensified program built on two pillars: first, the continuation and expansion of existing bilateral activities and, second, the enhancement of that work with a new region-wide initiative that it calls the “Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue.” Minister of Foreign Relations Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi launched the new initiative at a meeting with Central Asian foreign ministers held in Astana, Kazakhstan on 26-27 August. The new program commits Japan and the five Central Asian states to consult regularly as a group and carry out joint programs that will foster region-wide interaction and development. Central Asian countries were represented by their foreign ministers except for Turkmenistan, which sent only an ambassador. Since the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs treats Afghanistan as a Middle Eastern country it is not included under the initiative, but Japanese programs to improve transport to the South and other initiatives involving Afghanistan suggest that Central Asia Plus Japan will be attuned to Afghanistan’s needs and possibilities as well. A wide variety of initiatives have already been proposed, the list to be refined at a follow-up meeting. Judging by past Japanese projects in the region, one can assume it will include training and other work to combat the financing of terrorism, improve immigration and customs controls, provide aviation security, improve local administration and policing, develop the legal systems and transparency, support small and medium sized businesses, and promote advancements in the areas of energy and the environment. Of particular interest is the fact that Japan proposes to venture deeper into the areas of democracy building. In Astana Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke of the compatibility between developing a country’s unique culture and “realizing a democracy which respects the inherent dignity of human beings.” In particular, she pointed to the damage that “vested interests” can do to a country, and noted that Japan’s post WWII development hinged on its decision to stop paying salaries to the old samurai. Her call for “significant moral physical courage” in the cause of reform was not lost on her audience.

IMPLICATIONS:Japan has ratcheted up its involvement with Central Asia, taking advantage of its commitment to non-military solutions and programs. This change does not affect the Caucasus, however, which remain on the periphery of Japan’s interest, notwithstanding energy sources there. Also, Karabakh is a major stumbling block to deeper Japanese engagement in the Caucasus. By creating yet another forum for Central Asian regional dialogue, Japan follows the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Central Asia Cooperation Organization, Economic Cooperation Organization, and many other groups, not to mention all the major international banks and development agencies. Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue is not without political meaning, however, as Russia’s and China’s keen interest in the project confirms. While Japan disavows any political motive and affirms that its initiative is not directed against anyone, the very existence of the new entity increases the options open to the regional states themselves. The next steps in the Central Asia Plus Japan initiative remain undefined. It is likely that a meeting of senior officials will follow, and that this would lead to further sessions at the ministerial level and possibly then to a meeting of heads of state. With its new initiative, Japan has ratcheted up its engagement with Central Asia. By so doing, it implies that future discussions of the region’s interests in such diverse areas as economic development, trade, security, environment, and regional cooperation will have to include Japan, as well as China, Russia, the United States, and Europe. The scale of its program will set the bar for other aspiring participants, including India, Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran. The Central Asian ministers fully understand this. Acknowledging the benefits accruing from Japan’s presence on the scene, they unanimously voted in support for Japan’s inclusion as a permanent member of the UN’s Security Council.

CONCLUSIONS:Japan’s initiative fully harmonizes with US policy in the region and also that of the European Union. It represents a further step towards the development of what might be termed a “concert” of interested powers, i.e., an ever-expanding group of states that have significant interests in the region and believe they can best be protected by strengthening the region from within rather than from without. Such a “concert,” if it develops further, will inevitably be built on the realization by outside powers that they all gain most by practicing mutual self-restraint rather than by seeking unilateral or bilateral advantage, let alone by seeking economic or geopolitical dominance.

AUTHOR’S BIO:S. Frederick Starr is Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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