BACKGROUND:The Soviet Union’s fall ended Russia’s military presence in most of the Central Asian and Caucasian countries. Moscow maintained some of its bases in Georgia and Armenia, while keeping a small number of troops in the Central Asian countries, excluding Uzbekistan, to guard their international borders as their respective military forces in-formation were unable to perform the task. As a result, Russia ended up with a limited degree of military presence in its former Asian republics in the early 1990s. Such presence decreased over time as most of them established their own border guards who eventually substituted their Russian counterparts. Thus, in 2003, the presence of the Russian military in Central Asia at a significant scale was confined mainly to its 201st Division in Tajikistan. The Tajik government allowed it to remain in its territory as a force to count on in case of a new round of civil war and as a deterrent to any military adventure by neighbouring Uzbekistan, added to its patrolling of Tajikistan’s border with unstable Afghanistan. In the Caucasus, apart from Russia’s secured base in Armenia, a country preserving strong ties with Russia for various political, economic and military/security reasons, the fate of the three Russian military bases in Georgia after the closure of one are uncertain. Tbilisi’s insistence on their closure, which has continued to this date, was, and still is, a source of tension in Georgian-Russian relations. Briefly, while Russia was facing a sharp decline in its military presence and influence in neighboring Central Asia and the Caucasus, the United States was experiencing the opposite. Added to its “temporary” bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, its growing military ties with most of the regional states and their activity in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program, guaranteed Washington a degree of military presence of some form in all of them, excluding Turkmenistan. Georgia’s availing an air base to the Americans for their operation in Iraq and its hosting of American military “advisers” allowed Washington to secure a military presence in ascendance in both the Caucasus and Central Asia.

IMPLICATIONS:Concerned about the military development in its vicinity, Russia’s efforts to change the tide in Central Asia and the Caucasus have reflected in its attempts to resurrect the Collective Security Agreement, which involves Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus and Russia, as well as in its efforts to strengthen the Shanghai Cooperation Organization consisting of the first-mentioned three states, Uzbekistan, China and Russia. Apart from selling arms to its former republics, Moscow has also sought to obtain bases in the countries appreciating the need for strong ties with Russia despite their friendly relations with the United States. Hence it opened its first permanent base in Kyrgyzstan in 2003 followed by the opening of the second one in Tajikistan a few days ago. Being on an official visit to Tajikistan, on October 16 President Putin signed an agreement legalizing the status of the Russian military base during his meeting with Tajik President Imamali Rahmanov. He officially opened the base located south of Dushanbe on the following day, after paying a visit to the units of Russia\'s 201st Division stationed in Tajikistan. As the latter’s personnel and equipment have been used for making the base operational, it is still unclear whether Moscow will keep that division as a separate entity. Being involved in a variety of activities, including guarding CIS international borders, it has been operating in Tajikistan since 1991. As a means to help Russia restore its fading military influence in the “near abroad”, the newly opened Russian base is a major development not only of importance to Russia, but also to Central Asia. Without a doubt, it will have a long-term impact on the military/security makeup of that region and, by default, on the United States, a non-regional power deeply involved in the oil-rich Caspian region neighboring a range of more or less active “troublemaking” regional powers (Iran, China and Russia) in the eyes of Washington. The opening of the base by the Russian president left no doubt about its importance for Russia and the Russian military doctrine in the process of getting over the devastating shock of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Being described by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov as a \"necessity of the time\", the opening of the Russian base in Tajikistan demonstrated the Russians\' pursuit of a more assertive foreign policy towards the \"near abroad\" aimed at meeting the looming American Challenge.

CONCLUSIONS:Although Russia has had a military presence in Tajikistan since 1991, the new Russian permanent base is a major development for Russia and also Central Asia. Since 2001, Moscow has been especially concerned about the expanding American military influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus partly manifested in Washington\'s acquiring bases, an indicator of its long-term plan to stay in Russia\'s proximity. Being the second Russian base in Central Asia, the opening of the Russian base in Tajikistan demonstrated not just Moscow’s success in securing a long-term foothold in that region, but its determination to deny the Americans a military monopoly there. Although various considerations, including political and economic ones, make a blatant and fierce military competition with Washington an imprudent, unwise and unattractive option for Moscow at the moment, the important interests at stake in Central Asia and the Caucasus as reflected in part in establishing the new base hints at Russia’s heading towards that direction. After all, as it sees it, Moscow must meet the growing American military challenge before losing the game to the formidable challenger.

AUTHOR’S BIO:Dr Hooman Peimani works as a Senior Research Fellow for the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS), University of Bradford, UK.