BACKGROUND:Many of the fears cited above remain valid, even if the conclusion they seemingly pointed to has not taken place. NATO still does not have enough troops outside of Kabul and members are stalling on effecting major command reforms that would unite this force with the American led force and thus ensure unity of command, as well as multiplying those forces’ strike and peace support capabilities. There seems to be no good reason for this stalling and undoubtedly NATO secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is tired of going around with a begging bowl, to use his words, to get members to contribute to a commitment which they freely made. Here Again France and Germany seem to have let anti-Americanism get in the way of a commitment to a cause that is entirely legitimate, regardless of what one thinks about Iraq. Second, it is true that not enough has been done to break the warlords’ power in the provinces or to reduce the dependence upon opium as a fund-raising device for them and for Afghan farmers. But the warlords cannot be broken in the absence of sufficient troops to keep order and absent economic assistance to farmers so that they are not only physically secure against retaliation by warlords or terrorists, but also have viable economic alternatives to planting opium poppies. Thus the complaints of many observers that the international community has not done enough to either build viable state structures or crucially to live up to the financial commitments made in 2001-02 at Bonn and Tokyo are entirely valid. Such commitments are meaningless except as feel good stories unless they are actually applied to the crises at hand, state-building and agricultural dependence upon drugs. These funds also could go a long way to helping to rebuild infrastructure so that Afghans could begin to take part in international trade with their neighbors and stimulate investment and an overall influx of capital and skills into the country. Third, the American strategy that had stood aloof from nation-building in 2002 has been gradually and successfully revised and has played no small part in the elections’ success. U.S. forces are going after the Taliban in the South and East of Afghanistan, not by accident the areas of Pushtun concentration. Not only do such attacks enhance security, they apparently have substantially weakened the Taliban to the point where they could not launch major disruptions of the elections or launch major military campaigns against the forces opposed to them. This pressure must continue and it should be augmented by the greater contribution of NATO troops and with continuing pressure on Pakistan to strike at Al-Qaeda and its allies in the Pakistani border areas adjacent to Afghanistan, as it has done recently.

IMPLICATIONS:But beyond those activities, priority must be assigned to creating a national Afghan army that is both capable and loyal to the state rather than to warlords. Only 8,000 men have been trained so far, and after three years, that is not enough. Raising a national army and the means to support it through economic growth that accrues to citizens and to the state rather than to warlords is essential if Afghanistan is to survive as a viable state and not return to being a war zone and playground for terrorists. It is also not coincidental in this context that the creation of standing armies loyal to the state which could defend it against threats from within and without, and the concomitant creation of a national economy under state rule were the fundamental bases for European state building in the past. Supported by his allies, Karzai must deliver on these tasks to ensure the demise of the warlords or at least their substantial weakening while helping to grow the economy. This task is beyond his capabilities alone, but since NATO has stated that Afghanistan is its number one priority and the American strategy has effectively, if somewhat belatedly, acknowledged the importance of state building, there are cautious grounds for hope. These grounds for hope are buttressed by the Afghan people’s embracement of the fact that their government must be elected to be legitimate. This is a major though clearly incomplete step toward democratic government. If this government cannot deliver on security and growth, or if warlords and foreign governments are able to resume their habit of degrading Afghanistan’s integrity and sovereignty, then these elections will not serve as a basis for further progress. Thus for these elections to really signify lasting progress on the road to democratic governance, state building along the lines sketched out here must be priorities of Karzai government and his allies. Although, many of the past warnings turned out to be mistaken in their conclusions, they were accurate in pointing to the abiding threats that could still undo or stop the progress that has been made since 2001. NATO and the United States, as well as other allies in the campaign to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and secure it against future threats must implement the promises they have made. They must be willing to commit tangible, real resources, i.e. men and monies, to the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s state and economy and to the creation of national institutions like a flourishing government and viable army.

CONCLUSIONS:While it is too much to expect that all those who have habitually participated in the old or new great games around Afghanistan will simply retire from the field, it is possible under the leadership of America and NATO to induce them to see their interests in a broader and newer light. It is possible that they now see the value and urgency of a stable, secure Afghanistan which can stand on its own and not be plaything of external forces which can only be ousted by war. Naturally, in such a case they may have to sacrifice some of their interest, but they will also receive in return the much greater gain of security for their peoples and frontiers, a lasting diminution of the terrorist threat, and an opportunity to create a more durable and legitimate security order in this part of the world. The last generation of Afghan history conclusively shows that this foreign meddling ultimately leads nowhere and only creates a black hole that forces like Al-Qaeda can exploit to everyone’s disadvantage. Sacrificing capabilities that can not be sustained or that lead to no profitable end in order to eliminate that threat can only be a boon to everyone concerned, not just the Afghan people.

AUTHOR’S BIO:Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government.