BACKGROUND: Some progress was made on the diplomatic front, amidst the predictable accolades heaped on each state for their cooperation in the War on Terror. Uzbekistan has proven strategically important and remains so, given its proximity to Afghanistan where NATO’s has its peacekeeping role. However, many human rights groups have criticized western governments for their close military and security cooperation with Tashkent, raising potential problems in plotting a stable long-term course between NATO and Uzbekistan. Scheffer was unequivocal in his expression of support for the regime’s stance and the future it has as a key partner for the alliance within the region: “The human rights situation in Uzbekistan will not anyhow hinder cooperation between NATO and Uzbekistan,” he observed, noting the priority of seeking a long-term agreement on transit rights for the Alliance through the country into Afghanistan and continuing to cooperate in areas of mutual interest. Kazakhstan was praised for its participation in Iraq, sending and maintaining a small contingent of its peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT) despite the worsening of the security environment within Iraq and other nations choosing to withdraw their forces. Kazakhstan would like western assistance in expanding KAZBAT into a brigade, as well as furthering its own military reforms with special emphasis on border troops and developing its mobile forces. Scheffer highlighted how far Kazakhstan has gone in seeking closer cooperation with NATO, and acknowledged that the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs must be expanding to include more joint exercises with Kazakhstan and that an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) should be drawn up and implemented. Scheffer reportedly told Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev that NATO is seeking to expand its cooperation with Kazakhstan beyond PfP, and wants to engage in constant dialogue since NATO values the benefits of dialogue with Astana on the political and economic problems confronting the region. Scheffer was similarly pleased by his reception in Bishkek, being thanked by Kyrgyz parliamentarians for bringing the region to the attention of the international community, and dispelling the stereotype of Central Asia as a remote region. Altay Borubayev, the Speaker of the Kyrgyz Assembly of People’s Representatives specifically requested NATO’s help in re-equipping the army and supplying weapons. Tajikistan has led the way by signing an historic transit agreement with NATO to support ISAF forces deployed in Afghanistan. After meeting with Tajik President Rakhmonov, Scheffer hoped that similar agreements may be reached with other Central Asian states, in line with NATO’s search for additional transit routes for its forces in addition to Termez in Uzbekistan. A more unexpected source of success emerged during talks with Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov. During extensive discussions of the challenges facing the region and stabilizing Afghanistan, tentative steps were initiated towards reaching a transit agreement with Turkmenistan; NATO experts and counterparts in Ashgabat will now begin working on the details of such an agreement. If successful, it would represent a marked step towards offering NATO practical support for its operations in Afghanistan.

IMPLICATIONS: The tour was publicized by NATO as a diplomatic success, successfully clarifying certain issues, such as Uzbekistan’s troubled relationship with western democracies, and reaching a landmark agreement with Tajikistan on transit into Afghanistan. It equally served to solidify the growing links the Alliance is fostering with these former Soviet Republics, building on the political rhetoric at its the Istanbul summit. Practical measures have been taken to deepen NATO’s partnership with Central Asia, including appointing a Special Representative on the region and plans to send liaison officers to Central Asia and open NATO training centers. However, familiar with experiencing raised hopes, the Central Asian capitals now look for real practical evidence that this will affect their security environment and promote their own internal defense reform programs. PfP has proven a useful engagement tool, though it has also been limited in its scope to supply the necessary assistance to each country individually, since the programs are generic and therefore not tailored to suit specific needs of any one country. The needs of the Central Asian militaries are diverse and each country has to be treated separately and in sensitive ways that build trust and offer practical improvements to their armed forces and security structures. Unfortunately, in many of the regional defense ministries, this offer of greater Western involvement are often mistaken for a carte blanche supply of weapons and modern equipment. Yet what these post-Soviet structures require most fundamentally is assistance in moving away from their Soviet legacy forces, and enhancing their managerial systems and planning. Only once this has been addressed can other aspects of reform begin in earnest.

CONCLUSIONS: The Central Asian states are cautiously open to NATO’s overtures aimed at helping to reform their armed forces; they understand their need to reform but fail to appreciate how best to implement it and look to the Alliance for technical experience and assistance. For NATO, the real challenge is moving forward in the region alongside Russia, examining areas of potential cooperation. Russia’s opposition toward NATO’s earlier expansion and hostility towards its interests in Central Asia are becoming entrenched. Russian media reported the NATO Secretary-General’s tour of Central Asia in negative language, bordering on scathing denunciation, to skepticism that the Alliance really knows what it is doing within Russia’s southern sphere of influence. What is clear, however, in the aftermath of Beslan, is the emergence of greater impetus towards counter-terrorist cooperation between Russia and NATO, which may facilitate the development of a confluence of security interests in the region. If NATO planners can identify a window of opportunity and capitalize on Russia’s long experience of dealing with the region and move forward in a cooperative framework, based on openness and involving Moscow in the process, then there are grounds for optimism. Such an approach will reassure the Central Asian states, reduce regional tension, eschew great power competition and rivalry and bring opportunities for joint confidence building measures: Scheffer’s next stop ought to be Moscow. However, the appointment of the Special Representative for Central Asia and the Caucasus may also point to future trouble for NATO in its dealings with these regions: mistakenly lumping them together in the same generic process and placing them under the scrutiny of one political advisor to the Secretary-General, rather than fostering a more individually constructed approach to each of these countries. It is a potential error of judgment, and one that Moscow will watch carefully in the coming years. Meanwhile, the bilateral agreement between Russia and Tajikistan on amongst other security matters agreeing basing rights to Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division in Dushanbe, will remind the Alliance that Russia will not leave the region in any hurry.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Roger N. McDermott is an honorary senior research associate, department of politics and international relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK). He is also the editor (together with Anne C. Aldis) of Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, London/Portland: Frank Cass, 2003.