BACKGROUND: Coinciding with the continual developments in Georgia’s secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, bold steps in military cooperation with NATO and the U.S. mark the first anniversary of Georgia’s Rose Revolution. Just a day before the U.S. presidential election, George W. Bush sent a letter to President Mikheil Saakashvili thanking Georgia for its decision to boost its support for coalition forces in Iraq by deploying more troops dramatically, increasing the total number to 850. Following the assessment of a U.S. military mission currently working in Georgia, the U.S. will launch a new military assistance program for the Georgian armed forces. Georgian sentiments are running high about possible NATO membership. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s visit on November 4 reiterated the Alliance’s support granted by the adoption of Georgia’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in growing closer with the Alliance. Georgia is the first country among the partner nations of NATO to have formed such a document with the Alliance; the successful implementation of this two-year plan could lead to the working process toward NATO membership beginning as early as in 2007. Another small but telling change is the opening of a NATO Representation office in Tbilisi which will represent the Alliance in the entire South Caucasian region. Meanwhile, the humiliating defeat of Russia’s hand-picked candidate in the self-declared Abkhaz elections came as a shock to Moscow’s political circles, who took for granted that Abkhazia would let them deliver a pro-Russian scenario for this de-facto republic regardless of Abkhaz interests. While President-elect Sergey Bagapsh is getting ready to be sworn into office on December 7 amidst galvanizing unrest, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov made a rather reluctant recognition by saying that Russia supports Georgia’s territorial integrity but that the resolution of conflicts should not be over-accelerated. In Ukraine, after the first round of presidential race there is inescapable evidence that Russia’s support for Viktor Yanukovich against his pro-western opponent did help him win popular support. If opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko eventually prevails in Ukraine as the crisis unfolds, the entire geopolitical reality of the region will be significantly altered. Finally, a long-awaited meeting between Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian leader Edard Kokoiti has also been prompted by the fact that Georgia recently cracked down on smuggling through the South Ossetian enclave. The two sides agreed on demilitarization of the conflict zone by November 20.

IMPLICATIONS: All these are daunting developments for Moscow. Russia’s policy-engineers were taken aback by fact that the desire of de-facto republic to be separated from Georgia does not equal a wish for integration with Russia. Whether the current voting mindset might spill over into confidence-building towards Georgia remains to be seen. One thing is certain, however: President-elect Bagapsh’s electoral base turned heavily on opposition to Russian-backed candidate, and will be pressing into a direction that will not necessarily go in tone with Russia’s future strategy for the region. In South Ossetia, the removal of systematic and large-scale smuggling mechanisms seemingly counters Russia’s meddling in the conflict zone and may heavily influence the economy of this de-facto entity. President Saakashvili is determined to build a consensus around the economic and military stability of the country; return to the pre-revolution status quo is no longer acceptable. The current leadership clearly seems to have the political will to fight corruption and carry out reforms, and progress is evident specifically in the building of the armed forces where U.S. assistance plays a crucial role. The decisive re-election of President Bush is likely only to embolden U.S. foreign policy and re-invigorate America’s strategy for the region, making it highly unlikely that U.S. will distance itself from Georgia, which on a per capita basis is the second largest recipient of U.S. aid. As Georgia’s implementation of the NATO IPAP begins, the question of the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia will surface, and Moscow is likely to have to contend with a prospective NATO presence in Georgia over the next decade. With its own troubled share of the Caucasus, Russia is keen to keep stability in Chechnya as well as its special relationship with Armenia. All this while gratifying self-interest by interfering in Georgia has become a rather ambitious agenda for Russia. The biggest question now may be about what parts of that agenda official Moscow will choose to pursue. The challenge is to choose wisely.

CONCLUSIONS: President Saakashvili emerges determined to use his presidency to reintegrate Georgia’s secessionist parts back into a broad federal structure by the means of economic projects. While for Georgia, the effect on the ground will depend on direct negotiation processes with de-facto authorities, a more constructive Russian position in the Caucasus is essential. With Russia’s trademark instruments seemingly failed in Abkhaz and Ukrainian elections, Russia may want to rethink its traditional tools for the region. With Abkhazia’s apparent refusal to cede to Moscow’s my-way-or-the-highway domination, Russian influence in South Caucasus is diminishing. Moscow can either continue to pursue the same strategy for conceivable future, or look to more constructive options in the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Khatuna Salukvadze is a freelance analyst on the Caucasus and Central Asia. She holds master’s degrees from Harvard University and London School of Economics, and is based in Tbilisi, Georgia.