BACKGROUND: On November 19, 2004, Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov paid an official visit to Uzbekistan at the invitation of President Islam Karimov. Niyazov landed not in Tashkent, but in Bukhara which signaled the locality of the issues discussed. Their last meeting took place in September 2000, and subsequently relations became increasingly tense, given the Turkmenistan’s neutrality stance, its relations with the Taliban regime, increasing nationalism and discrimination of ethnic Uzbeks, and frequent border clashes since 2002 spiraling down a vicious circle of mutual accusations. Relations deteriorated even further when Turkmenistan accused Uzbekistan of complicity in an alleged coup d’etat against Niyazov in November 2002. Relations between the two neighbors are hence far from rosy. The officially stated agenda of the meeting included the joint exploitation of water resources, border demarcation, development of the Kokdumalak oilfield and the situation in Afghanistan. Both countries share water from Amu-Darya river, which is a crucial source for both countries’ heavy cotton agriculture. The presidents signed three agreements: on eternal friendship, on simplification of the border regime for residents of border regions, and on movement of personnel working on facilities along the borders. Cross-border communication between groups residing over densely populated borders could ease unnecessary border tensions. Apart from the official agreements, it is believed the two leaders discussed a row of unsettled issues behind closed doors. Issues of some immediacy included the rational and equal usage of the Amu Darya river and maintenance of the Tyuyamuyun reservoir. Rational usage of Amu-Darya is crucial, considering the straining of Uzbekistan’s relationship with water abundant Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Due to inefficient water usage, Uzbekistan experiences frequent shortages. Under the 1996 water cooperation treaty, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan share the Amu-Darya equally at the Atamurad city juncture. However, recent withdrawals of water by Turkmenistan and its plans to build an artificial lake in the Karakum desert does worry Uzbekistan.

IMPLICATIONS: Water sharing issues can result in significant tension among people dependent on crops for their survival. Until recently Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and to a lesser extent Tajikistan dominated the usage of the Amu Darya. With the relative stabilization of Afghanistan, which lies in upstream, it will start to use its rightful share of the water. Given the destruction of irrigation installations in Afghanistan during the war, it will in the short term be unable to keep water in reservoirs, and thus will use more water from the Amu Darya – which will be noticed in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The occasionally grandiose plans of the two countries also neglect the fact that Amu Darya is a major tributary to the dying Aral Sea. Another issue is the exploitation of the Tuyamuyn reservoir belonging to Uzbekistan, but located in Turkmenistan. Before 2000, Uzbek workers could travel to the reservoir for maintenance and operation. However, after 2000, border controls were expanded and movement was limited. As a result, Uzbek workers were obstructed at the border maintenance of the reservoir was compromised. This causes a danger of flooding in Uzbekistan’s Karakalpakstan and Khorezm regions and parts of Turkmenistan’s Dashoguz region, with large populations. The Kokdumalak oilfield is exploited by Uzbekistan though mostly located in Turkmenistan (it earns 70% of all oil revenues in Uzbekistan) and under a previous agreement Uzbekistan had to provide oil to Turkmenistan, but it did not when relations went bumpy. Uzbekistan built a new refinery in Bukhara with over 11 million ton capacity to process oil from Kokdumalak. Both countries have large gas condensate fields. However, their oil and gas exports are limited by the capacities of the existing pipelines, mostly Russian owned, and the lack of new pipelines that would diversify their delivery markets and would bring hard currency rather than indebted neighbors. In June, Uzbekneftegaz and Lukoil signed a $1 billion contract on exploitation of oil sites. Uzbekistan could hold 600 million barrels and Turkmenistan 500 million, significant resources but dwarfed by Kazakhstan’s 9 billion barrels. Due to the size of their reserves, their protectionist economies, and the shaky investment conditions, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are at loss competing with Kazakhstan over large foreign investments necessary to build new pipelines. This makes them less picky in their choice of partners. Right after Niyazov left Uzbekistan, Lukoil head Vagit Alekperov visited Uzbekistan, probably to proceed with plans developed based on concessions and agreements reached between Niyazov and Karimov. Turkmenistan is tied to Russian pipelines and there is no diversification of gas deliveries through other countries except a smaller Iranian gas pipeline. Russian Gazprom enjoys a monopoly following a 25-year contract signed in April 2003. Discussions on a possible Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline are being revived. Projected to cost $2-2,5 billion, it would link Turkmenistan’s Dovletabad fields with approximately 1.7 trillion cubic meters of gas with Pakistan. Its future depends largely on the availability of the Indian market, but Pakistani attempts to discuss a possible Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline suggests waning patience with the much-discussed trans-Afghan pipeline. Both countries have upcoming parliamentary elections in December. Knowing the presidents’ grip on their countries, democratic elections or major changes should not be expected. Some opposition forces suggest Niyazov tried to ensure that Uzbekistan would control the movement of ‘suspicious’ people, and that they would be extradited back to Turkmenistan if desired. This kind of movement control is also beneficial for Uzbekistan, considering the frequent cases of unrest in parts of the country. Human and minority rights were obviously not on the top of the meeting’s agenda. In November, the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution on the human rights situation in Turkmenistan, with a stress on religious and ethnic minority groups, including Uzbeks and Russians. Most of its potential and current ‘oil’ partners voted against the resolution, including Azerbaijan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Ukraine, while Kazakhstan abstained and Kyrgyzstan was absent. Russia voted in favor of the draft resolution, while Uzbekistan was absent, perhaps surprisingly since the resolution could help alleviate the condition of the Uzbek minority. Both governments show little concern for people within their borders, and hence protecting minorities abroad is hardly a priority.

CONCLUSIONS: Economic interests clearly dominated the agenda of the Karimov-Niyazov meeting. Both countries, suffering from tensions with their neighbors, need some sort of diversification, such as trade with one other. Access to Turkmenistan’s Caspian sea ports is of a great importance for landlocked Uzbekistan’s trade with Europe. Considering Russian companies’ practical monopoly over energy resources in Central Asia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan may seek alternative routes to deliver their energy resources to southern markets. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan recently signed agreements with Russian energy companies to develop hydro-power capabilities, which would allow them in future to be less dependent on Uzbek gas. Thus Uzbekistan’s gas leverage could loosen in Tashkent’s bargaining with those countries, whereas their leverage against Uzbekistan in water issues could increase. This made it crucial for Uzbekistan to secure water deliveries from Amu Darya for the sake of its cotton economy.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Maral Madi is Coordinator of the Narcotics, Organized Crime and Security Project, Silk Road Studies Program, Uppsala University.