BACKGROUND: In the early 1990s, immediately after the collapse of USSR, Iran adopted an assertive policy in a push to gain influence in Central Asia, both through export of its Islamic ideology, through economic ties, and implying its political agenda in a regional dimension under the aegis of international organizations. These efforts briefly brought the Islamist government in Tajikistan under Tehran’s wings in 1991-1992. Its defeat in the ensuing civil war transformed Iran’s policy into co-sponsorship of the Tajik peace dialogue on behalf of the United Tajik Opposition. Tehran managed to build close economic and political contacts with Turkmenistan, where Ashkhabad was interested in a alternative export ways for its gas resources. Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov also needed relations with a neighbor outside the CIS in order to further cement his isolationist foreign policy and strengthen his power inside the country. However, the key factor for the limited ambitions of Tehran in Central Asia was twofold: the unwillingness of the newly independent nations to fall under the wings of yet another “big brother”, and Tehran’s concern not to cause the outrage of the former “big brother” – Moscow. Hence, from 1993 until the present, Tehran navigates its relations with Central Asian countries following the principle of consulting with Moscow first, and avoiding any contentious issue that might provoke the Kremlin’s anger. In return, Iran received state-of-the-art Russian weaponry worth over $2 billion, advanced cooperation in building its nuclear power plant in Bushehr, and Russian political support in the international arena. A further reason that limited Iran’s geopolitical designs toward this region was America’s policy of containment of Iran. Washington has consistently been pushing hard to deny Iran strategic tools of influence over the region, like export oil and gas pipelines. The fourth limiting factor, which is still affecting Iranian standing in the region, is Tehran’s scarcity of financial resources and lack of technological know-how. Due to its economic problems, Iran cannot be considered a strategic source of foreign investment and new technologies for the economies of Central Asian states.

IMPLICATIONS: Tehran’s recognition of the necessity for active engagement with the countries of Central Asia while avoiding any contentious issues pushes Iran toward a pragmatic approach in bilateral relations with the region. Despite disagreements with Kazakhstan over the division of the Caspian Sea, since 1995 Tehran and Astana have been cooperating in oil-swap contracts. Depending on signed contracts, from 1 to 2.5 million tons of Kazakh oil are delivered to northern Iranian refineries and the same volume of Iranian oil shipped via an oil terminal in Kharq island. In addition to the Korpedzhe-Kurtkui gas pipeline, operational since December 1997, Turkmenistan also started oil-swap operations. In Summer 1996, a missing 320 kilometer link of strategic Trans-Asian railway was built between Tedzhen in southern Turkmenistan and Mashad in north-eastern Iran, which noticeably increased Iran’s importance in the transportation of Central Asian goods. After the 1997 peace deal in Tajikistan, Iran opted for mostly economic and socio-cultural cooperation with Dushanbe. Stabilization of Afghanistan as a result of the U.S.-led operation Enduring Freedom created an opportunity for neighboring states to probe cooperation projects with the new Afghan authorities. In June 2003, Uzbekistan signed agreements on trilateral cooperation on transportation with Iran and Afghanistan, in order to use Afghan territory for transit purposes. Most experts on Afghanistan agree that this kind of step-by-step incorporation of Kabul into the web of regional economy and transportation infrastructure can create a mechanism for Afghanistan’s sustainable economic recovery and facilitates long-term stability in that country. Trips by Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to Azerbaijan in August and Dushanbe and Yerevan in September 2004 yet again underlines Tehran’s intentions to cement and increase its economic cooperation, and especially investment cooperation, as a precondition for gaining political leverage in bilateral relations. Tehran’s policy of economic pragmatism and positive political engagement in bilateral relations with the countries of Central Asia so far has been a “win-win” situation for the involved parties. The regional countries have a direct interest in creating conditions for long-term sustainable development and indigenous stability mechanisms in Central Asia, and especially in Afghanistan. However, the most topical issue in the U.S.-Iranian and indeed global agenda today is concern over Iran’s nuclear program. In the current situation, Tehran finds itself surrounded by US troops in Iraq, the Gulf states, Afghanistan and Central Asia and the key question from Tehran’s vantage point seems to be if, where and when the U.S. foreign policy strategy of democratization of regimes in the Middle East will end.

CONCLUSIONS: Despite the volatility in world affairs and global terrorism, a traditionalist and pragmatic approach to international relations in the Greater Central Asia proves to be mutually beneficial. In particular, a peaceful Afghanistan holds great potential for the development of relations between Iran and Central Asia, as it will provide a route of transportation between Iran and the population centers of the region. The prospect of rail and road links via Meshed, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan could in the longer term be of crucial importance for the region’s economic development.

AUTHOR’S BIO: James Purcell Smith is a New York-based expert on Eurasian and Middle Eastern affairs.