BACKGROUND: The Georgian “rose revolution” made official Baku uneasy. At the culmination of the Georgian events, Ilham Aliyev’s government sided with president Eduard Shevarnadze, officially supporting him. Shevarnadze’s resignation and his opponent’s triumph was an embarrassment to official Baku, temporarily obscuring Azerbaijani-Georgian relations. On the eve of the Ukrainian elections, President Aliyev as well as the presidents of Belarus and Russia attended the sixtieth anniversary of Ukraine’s liberation from Nazi German occupation. The event, orchestrated by Russian president Vladimir Putin, was an indirect support of the Kremlin candidate Ukrainian Prime Minister Yanukovich. Seeing the financial and administrative resources controlled by Yanukovich, Aliyev’s government expected the victory of the Kremlin’s candidate. After the second round of elections, it became obvious that Yanukovich would not become president that easily. Widespread fraud, cheating, and deceptions in the Ukrainian elections led to a strong disapproval from the the United States and the European Union. Yet on November 24, the Kremlin acknowledged Yanukovich as president. Russia’s allies in the CIS – Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia – recognized Yanukovich as well. Uzbekistan initially followed suit, though it qualified its stance subsequently, blaming Russia of intervening in Ukraine’s affairs. Azerbaijan’s government decided not to rush with recognition. On the other hand, the Azerbaijani opposition tried to take advantage of the Ukrainian revolution. The Musavat party leader Isa Gambar made a blitz visit to Kiev to support Yushchenko. Upon his return, Gambar stated that the elections in Ukraine were not just a change of power. ‘This is a new era in the post-Soviet space. The events in Ukraine will impact all regimes in post-soviet republics.’ Gambar believes in an inevitable collapse of all authoritarian regimes in the former USSR. The leader of the Azerbaijan National Independence Party Etibar Mamedov also expressed his assurance that Azerbaijan would be ‘the next country that embraces democracy after Ukraine’.

IMPLICATIONS: Ilham Aliyev is in a difficult position. For the Azerbaijani president, supporting Yanukovich could have a detrimental effect. For the last five years, Azerbaijan has established its own balanced system of strategic relations with the West including the NATO and the EU. At the same time, Ukraine Azerbaijan’s strategic ally in GUUAM, and has permanently supported the Azerbaijani cause in international organizations. By allying himself with Russia, Aliyev would have lost support from the EU, NATO and the United States while it would have weakened Azerbaijan’s respect in the world’s democratic community. In the case of a Yushchenko victory, such a decision could damage Azerbaijani-Ukrainian relations too. Since 2000, Azerbaijan has built good and positive relations with Russia. This process has been strengthened lately. Before the Ukrainian elections, Aliyev’s team thought that it was possible to have good relations with Russia while being loyal to the West at the same time. But the Ukrainian elections required Azerbaijan to make a crucial decision. Despite increased pressure from Russia, Baku decided to wait for the end of the standoff in Ukraine. The Ukrainian “orange revolution” has implications for Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs as well. Since October 16, 2003, the opposition parties remain in an amorphous condition. In the last year, the activities of major opposition parties have shrunk. But the Ukrainian wind of change woke up the Azerbaijani opposition from its slumber. Obviously, the revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia are very attractive for Azerbaijani opposition parties, which failed to do the same in October 2003. The last opposition activities show that the opposing parties are considering various possibilities to use Georgia’s and Ukraine’s experience in Azerbaijan. Despite the ruling elite’s reluctance to support Yanukovich, it is unsettled by democratic changes in neighboring countries. The current government of Azerbaijan would rather prefer somebody like Yanukovich rather than any leader who came to power on a revolutionary wave. The current elite is still cautious toward the new regime in Georgia. In particular, the ruling elite fears the establishment of a youth opposition movement like the Georgian Kmara or the Ukrainian Pora. President Aliyev recently commented on the Azerbaijani opposition’s contacts with Yushchenko: \"They join demonstrations in foreign countries with ribbons on their neck. Let them do the same here. If someone is brave enough, he could tie a ribbon or something else on the neck and stage a demonstration here.” On December 3, Ziyafet Askerov, vice-speaker of the Azerbaijani parliament, accused Ali Kerimli, the leader of the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan of attempting a coup d\'etat. He stated that according to intelligence information, the Ukrainian youth organization Pora finances Kerimli’s party in order to repeat the Georgian and Ukrainian scenario in Azerbaijan. Kerimli denied these accusations. Instead, he argued that Askerov and the elite to understand that they cannot always falsify the elections. \"Our fight will result in a democratic change of regime,” Kerimli claimed, “Askerov and other members of the ruling team understand it and therefore worry.\"

CONCLUSIONS: Ilham Aliyev soberly understood that putting himself in the same boat with such odious leaders as Lukashenko, Nazarbayev and Putin would not strengthen his regime nor help Azerbaijan internationally. In fact, given the relative pluralism in Azerbaijan, it would increase the risk of making Azerbaijan the next candidate for revolution. Hence the president of Azerbaijan began to play the role of democratic leader in order to insure himself from further pressure from the Council of Europe, the EU and the United States. By refusing to recognize Yanukovich, Aliyev sent a persuasive signal to the West that he was not a member of the club of pro-Russian dictators. Despite the confrontation between the opposition and the ruling elite, both sides worked for the benefit and positive image of Azerbaijan. The Ukrainian opposition will remember the reluctance of Azerbaijan to acknowledge Yanukovich as president if they come to power. Even if Yanukovich would come out on top, it will not negatively affect Azerbaijani-Ukrainian relations. The future Ukrainian president will not have absolute power and will need to share it with a democratic parliament. The only negative effect from the Ukrainian standoff might be a possible deterioration of Azerbaijani relations with Russia. Aliyev’s defiance to follow Putin’s policies definitely annoyed the Russian establishment.

AUTHOR’S BIO Anar Valiyev currently is a Ph.D. student at University of Louisville, School of Urban and Public Affairs. He holds an MA in history from Baku State University and an MPA from Indiana University Bloomington.