BACKGROUND: Some political groups in Armenia have openly called for breaking with Russia and creating closer ties to the West. Such calls, for instance, were made during the recent congress of the former ruling party, the Armenian National Movement. Even a new oppositional alliance composed of the Liberal Progressive Party of Hovannes Hovannisian, the Republic Party headed by Aram Sarkissian, as well as former minister of foreign affairs Raffi Hovannisian was recently formed with an explicit agenda to move Armenia closer to the West and away from Russia. Other prominent politicians like Vazgen Manukyan and Paruyr Hayrikian have expressed similar views on a number of occasions. The government has been much more cautious in its rhetoric, but Armenia’s official policy has also seen a steady trend of building closer ties with the West reflected in Armenia’s enthusiastic participation in a number of NATO programs and exercises, as well as the decision to join the “coalition of the willing” and send a small contingent of troops to Iraq. Several questions arise, including the nature of the reasons behind this trend, how serious it is, and where exactly this trend is likely to lead? Growing Armenian discontent over the state of the relationship with Russia can be partially explained by a set of specific events that have taken place over the past two years. The first of these, which had wide public resonance, was the so-called “debt for equity” deal. This deal, which involved handing over several major industrial enterprises in Armenia to Russia in exchange for Russia forgiving Armenia’s $100 million debt to Russia, caused considerable displeasure in Armenia. It was widely discussed and condemned in the media and in public rallies organized by the opposition. The wide-spread perception was – and remains – that the deal was grotesquely unfair, and that Russia was exploiting Armenia’s weakness and dependence to establish control over the country’s most valuable assets. There were criticisms of this deal in Russia as well, but there critics argued that those enterprises were not worth as much as Armenia’s debt to Russia. The second important event was the conclusion of Russia’s observer mission to the presidential elections of 2003 that the elections were free and fair. Those who did not support Kocharian saw this as proof of Russia’s willingness to support any government in Armenia as long as it does its bidding. Public displeasure of was so strong that some demonstrators expressed it by first marching to the Russian embassy in protest, and then marching to the embassies of Western countries that had refused to certify Kocharian’s election to express gratitude.

IMPLICATIONS: More recently, Russia decided to close the border with Georgia following the terrorist act in Beslan, which also meant not allowing goods headed to Armenia to cross the border. Armenian pleas to allow these goods to cross the border were ignored, and soon enough the talk in Yerevan was that Russia had joined the Turkish and Azerbaijani blockade of Armenia. A veteran Armenian politician even stated in a private conversation that closing the border with Georgia was retribution for Armenia’s decision to send troops to Iraq. Whether or not that is true is irrelevant: what is interesting is the claim itself. Finally, Russia raised objections to building a pipeline through Armenia that would transport Iranian natural gas to Georgia with the possibility of later exporting Iranian gas to Europe. Armenia and Iran seem to have grudgingly acquiesced to the Russian objections, but the episode has not gone unnoticed in Armenia. These events are the predictable result of excessive dependence on Russia, which some segments of the Armenian political spectrum have always been concerned about. That concern is being articulated with increasing frequency with a growing perception in Armenia that the country’s tight relationship with Russia is being taken for granted and exploited by Russia. But that is not the only reason. It seems also that the Armenian political elites are starting to think that a certain adjustment in Armenia’s foreign policy orientation is inevitable given the increasingly conflictual tone of U.S.-Russian interaction in the post-Soviet space, combined with a shifting balance of influence that is not in Russia’s favor. This was exemplified most vividly by the “orange revolution” in Ukraine, but the Ukrainian events were only the last in a longer chain of similar, if less dramatic, defeats for Russia. There is a definite, and one might add reasonable, fear at least in some circles in Armenia that maintaining the same relationship with Russia may amount to betting on the wrong horse in the long run.

CONCLUSIONS: How deep are the cracks in the armor of the Russian-Armenian alliance, and will they get deeper? The short answer is that they are likely to get deeper, because the trends that created these cracks in the first place are likely to continue in the foreseeable future. But whether Armenia will be able to carry out a serious readjustment in its foreign policy will ultimately depend on two interrelated things. First, if the concessions the West demands from Armenia for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are seen there as more costly than continued dependence on Russia, a serious reorientation of Armenia’s foreign policy is unlikely. This, of course, assumes that Russia will be able and willing to continue to support the current status quo in Karabakh. Second, and even more importantly, Armenia will be able to reorient its policy only if the relationship with Turkey is normalized. As long as the border with Turkey remains closed, and as along as no diplomatic relations between the two countries exist, Armenia will see Turkey as an existential threat and Russia as the most credible protector against that threat. There are almost certainly other important issues that will affect Armenia’s long-term foreign policy orientation, but these two issues are definitely the heart of the matter.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Arman Grigorian is a Ph.D. Candidate in political science at Columbia University and a Visting Lecturer in Government at Wesleyan University, specializing in international security and the modern politics of the Balkans and the Caucasus. He formerly served in the first post-Communist government of Armenia, where he was born and raised.