BACKGROUND: As a regional power, Pakistan has sought to increase its presence in the Central Asian countries since their independence in 1991. This policy has reflected certain Pakistani objectives, i.e., economic gains, political influence and denying rapid expansion to Islamabad’s arch enemy, India. Although it established diplomatic relations with all the Central Asian states in the early 1990s, Pakistan failed to turn itself into a major player in Central Asia in that decade for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it did not have the resources to address the extensive financial needs of the Central Asians. Secondly, it did not have the needed advanced technology in many fields, especially high technology. Thirdly, it did not have the expertise and resources to help develop the oil and natural gas resources on which Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were planning to base their economic development. Fourthly, and directly related to the latter, its lacking a common border with Central Asia precluded its bid to offer a serious route for landlocked Central Asia’s main exports, namely oil, natural gas and cotton, despite its indirect land link with Central Asia via Afghanistan and notwithstanding of its offering access to open seas. The seemingly endless civil war in Afghanistan made any major economic transaction through that country with or via Pakistan unwise and practically impossible for the Central Asian states. Apart from its objective of achieving a strong and long-term presence in Afghanistan, Islamabad’s direct role in the Taliban’s emergence in 1994 and its backing of that group’s efforts to dominate the country aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan on Pakistan’s terms. Moreover, it sought to ensure Kabul’s friendly ties with Islamabad as a means to secure access to Central Asia. However, Pakistan’s identification with the Taliban whose northward expansion was a threat to the Central Asian states’ security made the latter reluctant in having extensive relations with Pakistan. A negative mood was prevalent in Central Asia regarding Pakistan until the Taliban’s fall in November 1991.

IMPLICATIONS: The removal of the Taliban removed a major barrier to Pakistan’s relations with Central Asia, but it did not automatically end the mistrust that had accumulated. Certain factors kept the regional states suspicious of Pakistan to this date. Apart from the Taliban’s ties with the Central Asian extremist/fundamentalist groups that remain fresh in minds, these included the leeway enjoyed by Pakistani fundamentalist groups and tribes believed to assist the Taliban in their fights to regain power in Kabul, and their support for likeminded groups from Central Asia. They also included the perceived continued support of the Taliban by the Pakistani secret service, the Inter-Services Intelligence, and Pakistan’s alleged tolerance of the Taliban’s presence in its two provinces neighboring Afghanistan. While tensions in Pakistan’s ties with the Central Asian states have reduced since the Taliban’s fall, relations remain far from close and cordial. This notwithstanding improving economic relations and educational ties. The prevailing suspicion in Central Asia aside, the continued instability in Afghanistan is still a major factor in limiting bilateral economic relations, while preventing the Central Asians from using Pakistan as a reliable major route for their international trade, including oil, gas and cotton exports. Signed in May 2002, the Turkmenistan-Pakistan gas pipeline project for exporting Turkmenistan’s natural gas via Afghanistan and Pakistan has remained on paper for that reason. Apart from instability in Afghanistan, Pakistan needs to address security concerns in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the three regional countries most affected by armed fundamentalist groups with real or perceived ties with the Taliban and their Pakistani mentors. Being the main victim of such groups, Uzbekistan experienced a very devastating year in 2004 as over 50 people were killed as a result of suicide bombings attributed by the Uzbek authorities to the fundamentalist Uzbek groups based in Pakistan. Against this background, a major reason for President Musharraf’s March 2005 visit to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was to deal with his counterparts’ security grievances. The 6 March 2005 anti-terrorist agreement between Uzbekistan and Pakistan is a step towards removing Uzbekistan’s security concerns that negatively affect its ties with Pakistan. If fully implemented, an end to Uzbek extremist groups’ presence in Pakistan and the extradition of their members to Tashkent as hinted by President Musharraf could help Pakistan replace the current suspicious with a more receptive one. That will be a minimum requirement for Pakistan’s expressed interest in membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional security organization in which all Central Asian states excluding Turkmenistan are members.

CONCLUSIONS: Undoubtedly, mending fences is a major objective for Pakistan in Central Asia and a necessity for expanding bilateral relations. This is important to Islamabad both for short-term political and economic gains and in order to help Pakistan consolidate its status as a regional power. Yet such status also requires Islamabad’s active involvement in removing destabilizing factors as a prelude to preserving peace and stability in the regions of importance to its long-term interests, especially those in its close proximity. Added to this, despite improving ties with New Delhi, Islamabad is still concerned about expanding Indian influence in Central Asia, another reason why it is keen to develop a stronger presence in the region. Hence Pakistan’s goal and the principal objective of President Musharraf’s visit to Uzbekistan is a more active role in Central Asia and particularly its security. However, given the history of mistrust in Central Asia, it takes more than signing agreements to change Central Asian leaders’ perceptions. Pakistan’s degree of seriousness in uprooting the Pakistani-based Central Asian extremists and their sponsors will be a major determinant for its success in breaking the ice in Central Asia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Hooman Peimani is a Senior Research Fellow with the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS), Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.