BACKGROUND: With independence in 1991, the government in Uzbekistan assumed the leading role in conducting economic and political reforms in the country. Due to this and other factors, the state retained its legitimacy in the eyes of people as an organization providing for their needs. The present poll demonstrated that a majority of those asked remain somewhat confident with the central government (57.7%). Confidence in local government stays above 47.8% but well below the rate of support for the central government. This fragile but obvious confidence is largely attributed to the (completely or partially) satisfactory performance of the state with respect to public security concerns, which among other include the pacification of inter-ethnic conflicts (“completely” according to 18.3% and “partially” according to 51.1%) and conflicts based on religion conflicts (21.6% and 53.8%). However, the public still remains concerned about related threats such as terrorism (58.4%), conflict (49.5%), human rights (46.4%), crime (44.3%) and corruption (32.3%). In addition, widely shared public criticism focuses on the central government’s failures in economic policies (46.5% partly distrust and 32.8% completely distrust the government), in measures to reduce unemployment (28.6% and 66.2%, respectively), in public services improvement programs (44.1% and 32.7%), in human rights policies (39.2% and 38%) and in measures to eradicate corruption among governmental officials (37.7% and 36.5%). Therefore, the public trust in the state’s capacity to solve these problems is weakening in the light of ever increasing economic problems and the inability of state institutions to appropriately deal with these problems. Disapproval rates (indicated by responses “do not fully trust” and “do not trust at all”) are the highest for such state institutions as local government (31.8% and 20.3%), parliament (31.7% and 26.6%), police (31.1% and 31.9%), public healthcare system (31.9% and 23.5%), labor unions (28.2% and 40.2%) and mass media (29.3% and 32.8%).

IMPLICATIONS: In contrast with weak public confidence, over half of those asked (63.2%) participate in national (47.4% “every time” and 15.8% “almost always”) and (57.7%) local elections (41.4% and 16.3% respectively). Yet, 82.1% strongly support or subscribe to the view that ordinary people cannot influence political decisions or the actions of government (33% and 49.1% respectively). This kind of attitude is predisposed by the firm belief or supposition (36.4% and 43.1% respectively) among respondents that politicians cease thinking about electorates immediately after their election into parliament. In addition, a majority (85.2%) also strongly supports or agrees with the suggestion that members of government do not pay much attention to what ordinary people think (39.9% “strongly support” and 45.3% “agree with” the statement). More than half (55.3%) of the people surveyed either “strongly believe” (20.1%) or “assume” (35.2%) that their votes in the election do not matter much. In terms of public expenditures, “increasing” or “significantly increasing” public spending is favored for the fields of public healthcare (49.7% and 37.1% respectively), public education (45% and 34.7%), retirement payments (34.5% and 58.6%), unemployment payments (38.8% and 33.5%) and army and defense expenditures (22.6% and 36.5%). This again reflects a public desire for enforcing a governmental social security package. On the other hand, public expenses aimed at enhancing the implementation of laws, the improvement of public transportation and investment in cultural development do not enjoy strong support. Public discontent with governmental measures toward the eradication of corruption among governmental officials can be specifically singled out as a point of high concern for respondents. A large portion of respondents consider personal connections (38.4%) and bribing an official (21.6%) to be effective measures to obtain a required document from governmental institutions, if refused by official procedures. Above all, the percentage of people (79.3%) who strongly agree (30.4%) or somewhat agree (48.9%) with the statement that bribery among civil servants is “widespread” is significant. At the same time, there is increasing concern that bribery and informal ties and connections as means to achieve one’s goals are becoming a public norm. This process is strongly opposed: for instance, an absolute majority (78.4%) favors appointments to various positions based on merit rather than personal connections. The desire for wider public participation is another side of weak public confidence in state institutions. Although 75.3% of respondents are “satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their election rights (28.3% “satisfied” and 47% “somewhat satisfied”) and 67.9% felt the same way about their right to be elected into governing bodies (16.6% and 51.3% respectively), increasing public pessimism with respect to political participation and enforcement of rights is also observable. A total of 62.5% of respondents felt dissatisfied about their right to organize meetings and demonstrations (31.1% “partially” and 31.4% “completely”); 64.7% felt this way about their right to free access to information on the work of government (30.5% and 34.2% respectively), 68.6% about the right to criticize the government (27.6% and 51% respectively); and 67.7% felt this way about their right to freedom of speech (26.1% and 41.6% respectively). Declining public confidence in Uzbekistan leads to further calls, both among the public and the political elite, for reforms of the political system to take into account the voices of ordinary people and their opinions. The majority of those asked rejects the systems in which one leader rules the country without interference by parliament (66.9% reject) or the rule by a military regime (82.1%). A government dominated by bureaucrats and technocrats is also not popular with most people (55.1%), suggesting that such a political system does not suit the realities of present-day Uzbekistan. The majority believes that a democratic system of governance is very suitable (43.9%) or rather preferable (40.1%) for the country.

CONCLUSIONS: Economic growth in Uzbekistan is still seen as the most important objective leading to higher income and a more developed political system. However, the public belief that a strong “developmental” state represented by a strong executive power can lead to high economic growth and then to democratic reforms may be weakening, as shown in the data on public frustration both with governmental economic policies and with the state of democracy in the country. On the contrary, there is a tendency in responses to support wider public participation in political life, democratic elections, enforcement of individual human rights and eradication of corruption among governmental officials as a path to enhance economic performance and improve lives of people.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Timur Dadabaev is an Associate Professor at the Institute of Oriental Culture (IOC), The University of Tokyo. These findings are the outcome of the AsiaBarometer Project at the IOC, The University of Tokyo conducted in Autumn of 2003 with 800 respondents on 40 questions in 10 Asian countries. For a more comprehensive outlook see the author’s \"Post-Soviet Realities of Society in Uzbekistan\", Central Asian Survey 23:2, 2004, 141-166 and Takashi Inoguchi et.al., eds., Values and Life Styles in Urban Asia: A Cross-Cultural Analysis and Sourcebook Based on the Asia Barometer Survey of 2003, Mexico City: SIGLO XXI, 2005.