BACKGROUND: Russia retains two military bases in Georgia, the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases, and the South Caucasus Headquarters, in Tbilisi. The total number of Russian personnel in the country is estimated at 3000 men. Following the 1999 agreement concluded in Istanbul, Russia withdrew the Vaziani base near Tbilisi, and partially also the Gudauta base in secessionist Abkhazia. The same agreement obliged Russia to reach agreement on scheduling the withdrawal of the remaining bases until 2001, but the negotiations were stalled. Since Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration took power from Eduard Shevardnadze, a trend has been apparent in Tbilisi to shift the crux of discussion with Russia away from the bases, hoping that progress can be reached in bilateral relations elsewhere, which would allow Moscow to withdraw its troops without losing face. Georgia took a more relaxed view of the bases especially after Aslan Abashidze was peacefully forced out of office in the Ajaria Autonomous Republic in Spring 2004. Previously, there was an underlining fear that the Russia’s Batumi base was propping Abashidze’s repressive government and could support it actively if it was endangered, but this failed to happen. Saakashvili has claimed that the bases only serve a symbolic purpose “to bolster imperial self-confidence [rather] than Russian security”. He offered security cooperation to safeguard the borders and make them terrorist-proof. Georgia’s foreign minister Salome Zourabichvili in June 2004 proposed the establishment of a joint anti-terrorist center in exchange for the withdrawal of the Russian military bases. However, hopes for progress in Georgia’s relations with Russia have been dashed. Russia refused to relinquish its support for Georgia’s secessionist provinces and allowed Russian volunteers to aid secessionists during the escalation of the conflict in South Ossetia in Summer 2004. Russia also interfered in the presidential election marathon in Abkhazia, aiming to install its own protégé. Russia vetoed the OSCE Border Monitoring Mission on the Russo-Georgian border in December 2004, while continuing to claim penetration of Chechen guerillas into Russia from Georgian territory. Although Tbilisi has awarded several large privatization deals to Russian companies, improving economic relations have failed to drive a political détente. As a result, in January 2005 the new round of talks on the bases has collapsed. Georgia has elevated the issue of base withdrawal to the forefront of the political agenda. After the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Georgia failed to bring progress in February 2005, the Georgian parliament – with nuanced support of the Foreign Ministry – initiated a resolution instructing the government to outlaw the Russian presence in Georgia, and seek forceful removal of the troops by January 2006, unless the schedule of withdrawal can be negotiated by mid-May 2005.

IMPLICATIONS: The elevation of Russia’s military withdrawal to the forefront of the bilateral agenda points at the frustration of the Georgian authorities in its efforts to find a common language with the Kremlin. The current tough stance in Tbilisi is a part of a plan articulated by Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili that can be titled “Russia’s Choice.” Zourabichvili maintains that Georgia remains committed to the European values of human rights and the standards of state conduct, while it is for Russia to demonstrate the degree of its commitment to these very principles. If Russia agrees to play with Georgia by international rules, and renounces its attempts to have special sway over the country, then Georgia would take steps to accommodate Russian interests regarding its security. If, however, Russian pressure continues, Georgia would not enter into covert deals regarding the bases, but would use the full force of international law and international forums to mobilize pressure on Russia and expose it as a pariah state. The Russian authorities argue that withdrawal is agreed in principle, but is impossible until the relevant facilities are available in Russia to move the troops. Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov stated he does not intend to “throw men and equipment into an empty field, as happened [with troops from] East Germany.” During negotiations, Russia demanded 11 years for withdrawal and immense financial compensation – according to former Georgian Foreign Minister Tedo Japaridze, the figure demanded was US$500 million in January 2004. During talks in January 2004, Russia has reportedly agreed to reduce the timeline or withdrawal to lesser, but equally inflated, 7-8 years. However, Zourabichvili’s policy seems viable especially in light of recent alliance between Ukraine and Georgia. It falls neatly within the framework of so called “Karpaty Declaration” of Saakashvili and Ukraine’s Viktor Yushchenko, which sees the regime change in these two countries as a part of a wave of democratization, which is to bring the former Soviet states into the European fold. The decision of the Georgian parliament, taken unanimously on March 10, was unexpected in Russia, and unprecedented not for its tough tone, but for the detailed course of action and the deadlines it imposed on the Georgian government. It also circumvents Russia’s apparent policy to renege on its 1999 commitments: if the parliament’s decision starts to be implemented in May, it would have nothing to do with negotiated terms of Russian presence, but with the sovereign right of Georgia not to have foreign troops stationed on its soil. There are also indications that the issue of the bases has been brought up at the highest level by the U.S. and European leadership in their talks with Russia. It seems that Georgia’s toughened stance bore fruit. The resolution was still being discussed on the parliament floor, when in an attempt to prevent its acceptance the deputy chief of staff of the Russian defense ministry said Russia would seek 3-4 years for withdrawal, thus almost halving the time requested by the Russian delegation only a month earlier. Following the parliamentary resolution, the date for the new, previously unplanned talks – March 23-25 – was also set, with the Georgian Foreign Minister cautiously optimistic about its results. In an optimistic scenario, the sides will agree on withdrawal in 3-4 years, which will open the way for signing a framework treaty on friendship and cooperation. President Vladimir Putin would broadcast it in Russia as a decision to stay in Georgia for that period, and can use the agreement as short-term political currency, by signing an agreement during the Victory Parade in Moscow in May, compensating for the Lithuanian and Estonian leaders’ decision not to attend. President Saakashvili, on the other hand, would use it as a long-term currency, quoting Russian withdrawal as a success by the time his first term expires in 2009. In a pessimistic scenario, the negotiations would fail, and both Georgia and Russia would be committed to the hard-line scenario that might destabilize Georgia, especially Akhalkalaki which is largely populated by ethnic Armenians who largely favor the Russian base.

CONCLUSIONS: A window of opportunity for normalizing relations between Georgia and Russia is rapidly closing. A decision to elevate the withdrawal of Russian military bases to the forefront of Georgia’s agenda shows that the Saakashvili administration is running out of options, and out of patience, in trying to normalize relations with Russia. Vladimir Putin’s administration, on its side, resents pressure and is tempted to mount a counter-offensive, only deterred by the fact that it would be hard to frame and justify it on the international arena. While the chance for a breakthrough in the March 23-25 talks remains, the degree of tension between the two states is likely to persist. If the talks were to collapse, instability in Georgia may mount following the May 15 deadline provided by the Parliamentary resolution.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Jaba Devdariani is the founder of Civil Georgia (civil.ge) and a works at the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.