BACKGROUND: Armenia’s close coordination with Russia in foreign policy matters was natural given the alliance between the two countries and the widely based perception in Armenia of Russia as the main provider of security vis-à-vis the potential Turkish threat. At present, Armenian foreign policy is undergoing some changes that can be best described as putting substance to its long-declared policy of complementarity. There is a real desire to strengthen relations with NATO, to have greater involvement with the EU, and also to behave as a true member of the Euro-Atlantic community. A discussion of this process requires an explanation of how the perception of the subject by the Armenian public has evolved recently. Recent polls conducted by the Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS), a leading independent think tank in Yerevan, show that the pro-Russian orientation, formerly prevalent among the general population, has been eroded. The causes of this change have their roots in Russian policy actions on issues that are very sensitive and of great interest for Armenians, first and foremost, the open and close relations Russia now has with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Certainly, Russia has its interests and will pursue them, but it would reasonable to expect that Russia would take into account the interests of its allies in the process. The would be North-South transport corridor linking Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran, the recent Russian-Georgia border closing, delays with Russian investment into five Armenian companies that have been transferred to Russia in exchange for nullification of the inter-state debt, among other issues, could not fail to have implications on public opinion. For common citizens, Russia’s behavior is seen as negatively affecting Armenia, and does not fit in the neat framework of the Russian-Armenian “alliance.” All these issues raise specific challenges to Armenia that the Armenian leadership is trying to address. Although there are limits to Armenia’s freedom to maneuver linked to the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and related consequences, Armenia is looking for deeper relations with other institutions and countries that would complement these shortcomings. On the security side, this means NATO and the U.S.; for economic and democracy reforms and development – the U.S. and EU; and for energy needs, Iran.

IMPLICATIONS: Since the first day of re-establishment of its independence on September 21, 1991, Armenia found itself in complex situation vis-à-vis its eastern and western neighbors, namely, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia’s desire to establish relations with Turkey faced a Turkish rebuff laced with pre-conditions, even as Armenian-Azerbaijani relations deteriorated parallel to the hostilities in Karabakh and skirmishes on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, as well as by Azerbaijan’s cutting of economic ties with Armenia. Given the demands by both neighbors that would have required major sacrifices from Armenia that it was unwilling to pay, Armenia was pushed to start looking in other directions, that is, the northern direction (Georgia and Russia) and the southern frontier (Iran). The constraints in place in 1991 – closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey – are still in place, and the establishment of an alliance with Russia remains the only feasible option even in retrospect. Armenia’s relations with Iran were, and have remained focused on transportation routes and trading. Even then, there is still no infrastructure or basis for deepening relations and given Iran’s autarkic economy, and the fact that bilateral trade has stagnated to a point where Iran barely made top ten among Armenia’s trading partners in 2004 (with Russia, Belgium, and Israel being the top three). For Armenia, it was sufficient that Iran pursued balanced relations toward both Armenia and Azerbaijan, a position it continues to preserve to this day. This North-South approach was satisfactory for Armenia’s interests and security until the changes brought by the Global War against Terror (GWAT). Subsequent changes in Russia’s approach, particularly the warming of its relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, have definitely undermined the perception of the Russian leadership in Armenian society as trustful ally. NATO and EU enlargement also have an impact in the general expectations of Armenians. The strong wish to become a member of the European family is becoming a more tangible notion with EU borders moving Eastward. Armenia’s geographical situation created another fundamental problem: the high dependence on Russia regarding transport and energy. Considering all possibilities, a situation could develop where Russia would like to exercise its power regarding transport and energy levers to put pressure on Armenia. Turkey’s closed border is the main factor impeding Armenia from reducing its dependence on Russia. At a February 24 meeting with NATO Special Representative to the South Caucasus and Central Asia Robert Simmons, Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian stated that “if Armenia did not have an unsettled conflict, it would have had the opportunity for a wider involvement into NATO various programs.” Due to the ongoing geopolitical dynamics, Armenia faces the following dilemma. On the one hand, a resolution of the Karabakh conflict would allow Armenia to deepen relations with NATO and in doing so, finally complement and balance its national security interests. On the other hand, a peaceful settlement of the conflict could, from Armenia’s perspective, only be based on mutual compromises that create a situation where the new entity of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic is recognized. Inclusion of Armenia in the European Neighborhood Policy also has its implications in the Armenian society and the idea of reaching EU membership standards is beginning to be discussed in society. Based on the promotion of the “Armenia 2020” project’s scenarios for the future of Armenia, the most supported scenario was one called “Going Home”, which envisions membership in the EU. Even though ENP does not envision ultimate membership for the country, civil society groups now discuss integration with Europe with renewed vigor and it appears this demand for European integration will only grow and push Armenia towards the West.

CONCLUSIONS: Armenian’s foreign policy today is closer to the declared principles of complementarity than it has been in the past. However, Armenia’s final decision in terms of choosing to orient itself toward Russia or the West depends on which option will fully satisfy Armenian national interests and enjoy the support of the population at large. Therefore if NATO and the West in general are truly interested in seeing Armenia pursue a more independent foreign policy, achieving this objective would require addressing the Turkish-Armenian border issue, while supporting Armenia’s effort to build an alternative gas pipeline with proper capacity. In this case, Yerevan will have much larger room for maneuver.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Tevan Poghosyan is Executive Director of the International Center for Human Development (ICHD), in Yerevan.