By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi
On January 2, 2024, Mullah Baradar, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs in the Taliban administration, announced that construction of the Wakhan Corridor, a strategic route connecting Afghanistan to China, remains underway. Baradar highlighted that the new road through Wakhan in Badakhshan Province is expected to establish a direct trade link between Afghanistan and China, thereby greatly enhancing bilateral trade opportunities. Taliban officials have underscored the geopolitical significance of the corridor, as it is positioned at a pivotal intersection of regional interests, potentially influencing broader dynamics in Central and South Asia.
BACKGROUND: Mawlawi Ayub Khalid, the Taliban-appointed governor of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, reported to Al Jazeera that, following five months of continuous work, they have constructed a road physically connecting Afghanistan and China. This milestone is anticipated to catalyze economic development across the region. The section of the road under construction spans 49 kilometers, with nearly 40 percent of the work completed to date. In the coming years, this road is projected to extend into China’s Xinjiang region, further solidifying the direct trade link between the two nations. The Wakhan Corridor, an ancient segment of the Silk Road connecting Afghanistan and China, first appeared on maps in 1895 as a buffer zone strategically positioned between the Russian Empire and British India, emphasizing its enduring geopolitical significance. Although the Sino-Afghan border was formally delineated in 1963, no border checkpoints were established, despite the two countries sharing a direct border. External factors, including the prolonged presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and concerns over the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) affecting China's security, had historically hindered the development of closer ties between Beijing and Kabul. China's strategic engagement with the Taliban underscores its long-term interests in Afghanistan’s remote Badakhshan province, specifically the Wakhan Corridor. This engagement reflects China’s cautious preparation for a regional realignment that began well before the U.S. withdrawal, as China employed diplomacy and development initiatives to strengthen ties with Afghanistan. Since 2012, China’s military and strategic involvement in the Wakhan region has gradually expanded, leveraging its location at the nexus of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan. In 2017, China pledged over US$ 90 million to support infrastructure projects in northeastern Afghanistan, including fiber optic connections and a segment of road through Wakhan. However, the presence of U.S. forces, delays in funding, and various political obstacles impeded progress on these initiatives. Despite previous setbacks, China’s vision for regional integration has remained steadfast. In 2021, the Taliban’s Ministry of Public Works announced plans for a road linking Afghanistan's Ishkashim district to China’s Xinjiang province through the Wakhan Corridor, part of a broader regional development strategy. Since the Taliban assumed control, China’s investments in Afghanistan have significantly increased, with substantial funding directed toward regional infrastructure projects. The long-anticipated construction of this critical corridor—expected to serve as a major trade and transit route between Afghanistan and China—has now officially commenced, signaling a renewed commitment to connectivity and economic collaboration between the two nations.
IMPLICATIONS: The Wakhan Corridor is emerging as a pivotal element in Afghanistan’s geopolitical landscape, with China and Pakistan actively involved in its development. Former Afghan Information Minister Mohammad Karim Khuram has highlighted that Pakistan had previously sought to utilize the corridor to establish strategic connections with Central Asia and China; however, these efforts were met with resistance under President Karzai’s administration. In early 2022, the situation evolved when the Pakistani military, in coordination with Chinese forces, crossed into the Afghan side of the corridor to adjust border demarcations originally established under the 1895 Russo-British agreements. This move provoked widespread backlash on Afghan social media, prompting the Taliban to deploy forces to reassert the historic boundary. Recently, the Taliban, with significant Chinese support, has committed to advancing the infrastructure within the Wakhan Corridor, underscoring China’s clear interest in integrating Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). High-level visits by Taliban officials and the Chinese ambassador to the corridor in August 2024 further emphasize the project’s strategic importance. Local communities believe that the corridor could play a crucial role in fostering economic stability, facilitating streamlined exports between Afghanistan and China, and promoting the development of surrounding areas. The Wakhan Corridor project illustrates China’s strategic intent to dominate Afghanistan’s economy, positioning itself as a key trade partner while outmaneuvering competitors such as Uzbekistan, Iran, the UAE, and India. By establishing a direct trade route, China seeks to circumvent more expensive, indirect pathways through Pakistan or Uzbekistan, thereby consolidating its economic influence in Afghanistan. Additionally, the project aligns with Pakistan’s broader goal of enhancing its trade connections with Central Asia, sidelining India’s influence in the region. From a security perspective, the Wakhan Corridor provides China with a buffer zone to secure its sensitive Xinjiang region. Concerns regarding groups like ETIM and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) have driven China to create a “security belt” along the corridor, supported by two dedicated security units and coordinated patrols with the Taliban to reinforce local stability. China’s growing investment in Afghan infrastructure projects, including those in resource-rich areas such as the Amu Darya oil fields, further underscores its strategy of embedding economic initiatives that enhance regional security while serving its broader geopolitical interests. Although China and the Taliban have forged a cooperative relationship, a level of mutual distrust endures, adding complexity to their interactions. The Wakhan Corridor project thus functions as both a diplomatic bridge and a strategic instrument for China, enabling it to manage regional threats while embedding itself economically and geopolitically in Afghanistan’s future. The Wakhan Corridor holds substantial strategic potential, positioning itself as a critical link that could connect China to Iran and onward across Central and South Asia through Afghanistan. This vision aligns with Iran’s aspirations for regional connectivity but faces opposition from India, whose border tensions with Pakistan in the Azad Kashmir region complicate cooperation on such initiatives. Functioning as a contemporary extension of the ancient Silk Road, the corridor is poised to have far-reaching economic and security ramifications, likely reshaping the regional balance of power. Its development could redefine trade routes, potentially offering more efficient access between East and West, while also bolstering China's influence across a corridor that traverses key geopolitical frontiers. As both a trade artery and a security buffer, the Wakhan Corridor embodies the intersection of historic ambitions and modern strategic interests, with the capacity to influence the economic and political landscape of Central and South Asia for years to come.
CONCLUSIONS: China’s present approach to Afghanistan reveals a meticulously crafted strategy that emerged following the U.S.-led withdrawal in 2021. With the exit of Western forces, Chinese policymakers identified a strategic window to establish direct engagement with the Taliban. This shift allowed China to reinvigorate major projects, including the Amu Darya oil fields, as well as gold mining operations in Takhar and Badakhshan, while reconsidering the long-stalled Mes Aynak copper mine project, originally awarded to China in 2010. However, China’s deepening involvement in the Wakhan Corridor signals a focus that extends beyond economic objectives, highlighting a pronounced interest in regional security and geopolitical stability. The Wakhan Corridor not only represents an opportunity to secure valuable resources but also functions as a strategic zone for monitoring and mitigating regional threats. Through this multifaceted engagement, China is navigating a balance between bolstering Afghanistan’s infrastructure and securing its own influence, underscoring the corridor's importance within a broader vision of Central and South Asian stability and security. China’s presence in the Wakhan Corridor serves as a calculated measure to counter threats from extremist groups, particularly ETIM, which poses potential risks to the stability of its border regions, especially Xinjiang. This approach aligns seamlessly with China’s broader strategy to reinforce stability across Central Asia—a region where China has made substantial investments and is consolidating its role as the dominant economic force. For the U.S., China’s expanding footprint along the Wakhan Corridor is a growing point of concern, as it threatens to reduce U.S. influence within Eurasia, particularly in areas related to counterterrorism and regional diplomatic leverage. Washington remains closely attuned to China’s evolving role in Afghanistan, apprehensive that deepening Beijing-Kabul relations could disrupt U.S. strategic interests in the region. This shifting dynamic underscores the broader geopolitical contest over influence in Central and South Asia, where China’s calculated moves may challenge the United States' longstanding objectives in both regional security and diplomatic outreach. The unique geography of the Wakhan Corridor offers China a strategic opportunity to establish an efficient trade and energy route into Central Asia, potentially shortening pipeline distances and bolstering its energy security. If successfully developed, this initiative would solidify China’s position as both a dominant economic and military power in the region. The corridor serves as a critical junction where China’s economic ambitions converge with its security priorities, creating a dual-purpose pathway that addresses both its energy needs and regional stability concerns. As a result, the Wakhan Corridor could serve as the foundation for a robust Chinese presence that is likely to influence the regional order for the foreseeable future, shaping economic relations and security dynamics across Central and South Asia.
AUTHORS’ BIOS:
Aigerim Turgunbaeva is an independent journalist focusing on Central Asia. Aigerim writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, Eurasianet. She is a 2024 CAMCA Fellow.
Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Research Fellow on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan and Regional Studies. Ghiasi writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals.
Over the past decade, “Debt-trap Diplomacy” has emerged as a significant instrument for China to advance its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The inability of certain nations, such as Sri Lanka and various African countries, to repay their loans has resulted in China acquiring ownership of key infrastructure, including ports and mines. However, the repercussions of China’s debt-trap diplomacy vary across Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan’s debt to China is considered the most manageable within the region. Uzbekistan, benefiting from economic growth, and Turkmenistan, leveraging gas exports to China, do not encounter substantial difficulties. Conversely, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most susceptible Central Asian nations to China’s “Debt-trap Diplomacy.”
BACKGROUND: The concept of “Debt-trap Diplomacy” was first introduced by Indian academic Brahma Chellaney in 2017. This term describes a relatively new policy tool employed by China in connection with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The strategy involves China extending excessive loans to low-income, heavily indebted countries that are unable to repay them. Consequently, these borrowing nations are compelled to cede strategic assets to China in a debt-for-equity swap to alleviate their debt burden. Recent studies indicate that Beijing has also become a significant emergency rescue lender to these same countries, many of which are struggling to manage their debts. Between 2008 and 2021, China allocated US$ 240 billion to bail out 22 countries, predominantly those involved in Xi Jinping’s BRI. Countries such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Mongolia, Zambia, Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia have been notably impacted by China’s debt-trap policy in recent years. A prominent example of this policy is the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. The Chinese government provided a loan for the port’s development, which was carried out by Chinese contractors. When Sri Lanka failed to meet its loan repayments, China leased the port for 99 years as a form of debt repayment. This 99-year lease is strategically significant for Beijing, particularly in the context of its competition with India in the Indian Ocean. In Central Asia, statistical data indicate that with the expansion of China’s economic and commercial influence, the debt owed by countries in this region to Beijing has increased significantly. By the first half of 2023, Central Asia’s collective debt to China had reached US$ 15.7 billion, representing 7.6 percent of the region’s external debt. Kazakhstan, in particular, has accumulated a substantial amount of hidden debt. According to central bank data, as of January 1, 2024, Astana owed US$ 9.2 billion, primarily to the China Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank). However, this debt constitutes only about 3.5 percent of Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product (GDP), a figure that has remained relatively stable over the past three years. Tajikistan, on the other hand, owes an estimated US$ 3.3 billion to foreign investors, with half of this amount owed to China, equating 27 percent of its total GDP. Consequently, China is Tajikistan’s primary creditor. According to the Ministry of Finance of Tajikistan, as of early 2024, the country’s debt to China stood at US$ 900 million, which accounts for 27.8 percent of its total external debt. By the end of 2023, Uzbekistan’s debt to China amounted to US$ 3.775 billion, representing just under 13 percent of its total external debt. Notably, by 2022, the China Development Bank (CDB) held US$ 2.2 billion of this debt, making it Uzbekistan’s third-largest creditor. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, has approximately US$ 4 billion in outstanding loans to China, which constitutes around 40 percent of its total GDP. This equates to roughly US$ 700 owed to China per Kyrgyz citizen. The country’s bilateral concessional loans exceed US$ 2 billion, or 44 percent of its total debt. Of this, 36.7 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign debt is owed to the Export-Import Bank of China, amounting to US$ 1.7 billion in 2023. Akylbek Japarov, the chairman of the Kyrgyz Cabinet of Ministers, has stated that the country has reached the peak of its external debt payments. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov has expressed optimism that, if the current situation remains stable, the country’s foreign debt could be paid off by 2035. Regarding Turkmenistan, the information available is limited and unclear. The only notable instance is a statement by then-President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov on June 12, 2021, asserting that Turkmenistan had fully repaid loans provided by China for the pipeline and the first stage of the Galkynysh gas field development on time and in full.
IMPLICATIONS: Over the past two decades, China has supplanted Russia as the primary economic and trading partner of Central Asian countries. Debt-trap diplomacy plays a crucial role in solidifying this shift. The inability of Central Asian nations, particularly those with weaker economies like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, to repay their loans could result in China acquiring ownership of key infrastructure within these countries. For instance, China might gain control over the Kyrgyz thermal power plant in Bishkek, the Datka-Kemin power transmission line, and the road connecting the northern and southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. Similarly, China could potentially own and manage Tajikistan’s gold and silver mines. Consequently, the capacity of Central Asian countries, especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, to repay their debts to China holds significant and long-term strategic implications. Debt repayment can sustain China as a crucial economic and trade partner for Central Asian countries, which is vital for maintaining a balance against Russia. However, the inability to repay these loans will lead to a strong dependence on China, creating conditions similar to Russia’s relationships with Belarus and Armenia. In 2002, under the “Property for Debt” agreement between then-President of Armenia Robert Kocharian and the Russian Federation, Armenia’s inability to repay its loans resulted in the Russian government taking ownership of significant economic infrastructure, including electricity, gas, telecommunications, and railways. This process has significantly contributed to Armenia’s strong dependence on Russia. Even after two decades, despite considerable dissatisfaction with Russia, Nikol Pashinyan’s government has struggled to establish a more independent and diverse foreign policy. Similarly, debt-trap diplomacy and China’s potential ownership of infrastructure could lead to comparable outcomes for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, akin to the situation in Armenia or the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. This scenario poses a serious challenge for these small Central Asian countries in terms of “diversifying” and “balancing” their foreign policies. This challenging process has led to a rise in anti-Chinese sentiments and Sinophobia in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in recent years. Notably, in 2011, Tajikistan resolved a border dispute by ceding land, a move believed to be part of a debt relief agreement with China. Furthermore, in 2018, over 30,000 Chinese migrants, many of whom were construction workers on BRI-funded projects, arrived in Kyrgyzstan. Given this context, there are serious concerns about the negative and potentially dangerous consequences of China’s debt-trap diplomacy in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Tajik political scientist Parviz Mullojanov has warned that accumulating Chinese debt is “playing with fire,” as it could serve as a pretext for political and geopolitical expansion at any moment. However, leaders and experts close to Central Asian governments dismiss these concerns as Western propaganda against China. They argue that borrowing and repayment are part of economic interdependence in today’s world, which can foster economic growth. This perspective is reflected in signs around Tajikistan’s capital that read: “Assistance from China for a common future.” On the other hand, the lack of transparency in Chinese loan agreements, coupled with infrastructure investments, has exacerbated issues of corruption and oligarchy. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan appear to face fewer challenges and threats from China’s debt-trap diplomacy, largely due to their stable and growing economies. Additionally, Turkmenistan stands out as the only Central Asian country with a positive trade balance with China, primarily due to its gas exports. Consequently, the loans and debt to China, whose full extent remains unclear, do not pose a significant threat to Turkmenistan’s economy.
CONCLUSIONS: Over the past 22 years, China has invested US$ 105 billion in Central Asia through development finance, with the China Development Bank (CDB) playing a pivotal role in this process. “Debt-trap Diplomacy” has become a crucial tool for advancing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as it enters its second decade. During a virtual summit in January 2022, marking 30 years of diplomatic ties with Central Asian countries, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would provide US$ 500 million in aid to Central Asia over the next three years to support socially significant projects. Furthermore, in October 2023, at the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, China and Central Asian states adopted a joint action plan for developing green technology in the region. Given these developments, it is expected that China’s loan policies and debt-trap diplomacy will continue in Central Asia. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine presents an opportunity for China to further expand its economic and financial influence in the region, similar to the Ruble Crisis of 1998. However, the impact of China’s debt-trap diplomacy varies across Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan’s debt to China is considered the most manageable by regional standards. Uzbekistan, benefiting from economic growth, and Turkmenistan, with its positive trade balance due to gas exports to China, do not face significant challenges. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most vulnerable to China’s debt-trap diplomacy. If these countries are unable to repay their substantial debts to China, which constitute a significant portion of their GDP, they may face situations similar to those experienced by Sri Lanka and Armenia. This could pose serious challenges to their efforts to diversify and balance their foreign policies.
AUTHOR'S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .
WILL THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION RECONFIGURE REGIONAL EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION?
By Rafis Abazov
The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana has rekindled discussions on the role of the organization in reshaping regional educational cooperation. Historically known for its focus on security and economic issues, the SCO is increasingly recognizing education as a cornerstone for sustainable development and regional stability. This shift is significant for member states—China, Russia, India, and several Central Asian countries—as they navigate the complexities of globalization and seek to bolster their human capital. The main question is whether declarations at the summit denote a shift in the regional educational architecture.
BACKGROUND: Since its inception in 2001, the SCO has primarily concentrated on security cooperation and economic integration among its member states. However, the need for a skilled workforce, capable of driving innovation and economic growth, has brought education into the spotlight. The Astana SCO-2024 Summit underscored this shift, highlighting the potential of educational cooperation to foster mutual understanding, enhance economic ties, and promote cultural exchanges. In recent years, the SCO has launched various educational initiatives. The establishment of the SCO University Network, the SCO Youth Council and regional scholarship themes led to a sharp increase in regional student mobility – for example China reached a milestone in 2022 by attracting one million foreign students, while Kazakhstan attracted almost 30,000. Indeed, these efforts facilitated academic exchanges, joint research projects, and cultural interactions among students and scholars from member countries. The Astana summit built on these foundations, proposing a more structured and collaborative approach to educational cooperation, as almost one quarter of the 31 agreements signed during the summit were dedicated to the area of science and education. On top of this, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Science and Higher Education hosted the regional conference “Cooperation in the field of higher education and production integration,” focused on developing a unified approach to accreditation, curriculum design, quality assurance, student mobility and mutual recognition of qualifications.
IMPLICATIONS: One of the important areas discussed at the Astana summit was the enhancement of academic exchanges and research collaborations. By fostering partnerships between universities and research institutions across member states, the SCO aims to create a robust network of knowledge and innovation. Such collaborations can lead to significant breakthroughs in various fields, from science and IT technology to social sciences and smart agriculture.
The proposed initiatives include exchange programs for students and faculty, joint research projects, and the creation of cross-border academic networks and joint research labs to study the impact of climate change at the regional and sub-regional levels. These efforts are expected to enhance the quality of education and research in member states, making them more competitive on the global stage. Another critical focus is the harmonization of educational standards across SCO countries. This alignment would not only enhance educational opportunities but also support a more integrated approach to developing double diploma programs between universities.
The summit proposed the creation of a common framework for higher education within the SCO. This framework would include standardized guidelines for curriculum development, accreditation processes, and quality assurance mechanisms. Such harmonization can make it easier for students to transfer credits between institutions in different countries and for professionals to have their qualifications recognized across the region. The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the importance of digital education and technological integration.
The SCO members acknowledged that there is a rapid shift towards online learning, and an urgent need to invest in digital infrastructure and resources. The Astana summit highlighted the potential for collaboration in developing e-learning platforms, distance education programs, and digital literacy initiatives. In this context, the leading Chinese universities (such as Chinese Agriculture University) took initiatives to exploring ways of leveraging technology to bridge the digital divide among member states by promoting access to quality education and facilitating lifelong learning and upskilling, essential for adapting to the rapidly changing job market.
The creation of cohesive and inclusive frameworks would help to upscale the internationalization of education by integrating educational systems, and organizational cultures across SCO member states, and developing joint digital infrastructure. However, these initiatives require significant investments. Indeed, economic disparities among member states pose significant challenges. While some countries have advanced educational and digital infrastructures, others may struggle with limited resources and capacity. At least three countries – China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – have allocated significant resources for bridging this gap, supporting deeper educational collaboration, and accelerating the adoption of online learning, access to digital tools and other resources.
CONCLUSION: The Astana summit SCO-2024 has set the stage for the SCO to play a transformative role in regional educational cooperation. As member states work to align their educational systems and policies, the organization is poised to reshape the regional educational architecture significantly. With a focus on academic collaboration, standardization, and digital innovation, the SCO is on a path to create a more integrated and dynamic educational ecosystem.
The success of future initiatives will depend on building on the foundations laid by existing programs. Strengthening and expanding platforms like the SCO University Network, the SCO Youth Council and numerous educational consortiums can provide a solid base for more ambitious projects. These platforms can serve as hubs for collaboration, innovation, and cultural exchange. Effective implementation requires the active engagement of various stakeholders, including governments, educational institutions, the private sector, and civil society. Collaborative efforts and partnerships can ensure that initiatives are well-designed, adequately funded, and effectively implemented.
The SCO has the potential to reconfigure regional educational architecture by enhancing educational cooperation and recognizing education as a cornerstone for regional development and peaceful integration. The outcomes of the Astana meeting signal a promising future for educational collaboration in the SCO region, with the potential to yield significant economic, social, and cultural benefits. As the SCO continues to evolve, its focus on education can play a transformative role in shaping the region’s future. By fostering a more interconnected and innovative educational landscape, the SCO can contribute to a more prosperous, stable, and cohesive region.
The Astana summit has marked a new chapter in this journey, setting the stage for the SCO to reconfigure the regional educational architecture in meaningful and impactful ways. Joint research projects and academic exchanges can generate new ideas, technologies, and solutions to common problems. This, in turn, can drive economic growth and increase competitiveness, positioning the SCO region as a leader in various fields.
AUTHOR’S BIOS: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007), The Stories of the Great Steppe (2013) and some others. He has been an executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan since 2014 and participated at the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan.
THE NEW CHALLENGE TO THE SCO
By: Stephen Blank
The recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Astana reveals that both Moscow and Beijing are seeking to reformat the organization in order to meet their global rather than its original regional goals. That process represents a serious challenge to the foreign policy autonomy and interests of Central Asian states and probably to regional security. As the center of gravity of world politics shifts ever more to Asia, the role and importance of Central Asia is likely to grow. These trends should be recognized and acted upon to assure that Central Asia does not become a closed sphere of Sino-Russian influence, which would retard its growth and transform it into a breeding ground for conflict.
BACKGROUND: The SCO was first set up to create an institutional framework by which China’s growing importance in and to Central Asia could be regulated. At the same time, it also constituted a forum for Central Asian governments whereby they could address not only each other but also Russia and China concerning their interests and needs and where all the parties could reach agreement on how to contend with shared threats, e.g. the genuine and continuing threat of terrorism. As such the SCO gradually evolved into a viable regional security forum where both Moscow and Beijing could present or implement their regional security initiatives and Central Asian states could present their interests and needs. Thus, it functioned to satisfy all the members’ needs as a purely regional security organization.
However, as world politics evolved towards a world order characterized primarily by great power rivalry and even threats of nuclear confrontation, Russia and China clearly intend to impart a wholly new purpose and direction to the SCO that threatens the interests of the Central Asian states. Membership now includes India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus. These additions to the SCO’s roster are primarily attributable to Sino-Russian maneuvers – great power calculations that outweigh regional concerns. Moreover, these new members of the SCO have also brought their rivalries, especially those between India and Pakistan over Afghanistan and Kashmir, and India and China over China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), into the SCO, probably rendering the organization less effective as a security provider. Finally, Russia’s war in Ukraine has also undermined its reputation as a security provider in Central Asia, not least because high-ranking scholars like Sergei Karaganov and officials regularly make veiled and even unsubtle threats against Kazakhstan, which they claim to be part of Russia.
Recent trends, as expressed at the SCO summit in Astana and other high-level Russo-Chinese gatherings, indicate that both Russia and China have abandoned the idea that the SCO serves mainly as a regional security institution. In numerous speeches, Putin, Xi, and spokesmen for their policies now openly state that the SCO, like the BRICS, manifests a new and evolving form of multipolar politics led by Moscow and Beijing, which herald the rise of the East and South against a supposedly decrepit West. In this self-serving ideological depiction of the emerging world order, these formerly regional or economic organizations function to attack the West and validate Moscow’s and Beijing’s hegemony over weaker neighbors like Central Asia. This hegemony entails an unquestioned division of the world into spheres of influence and the extreme minimization of foreign influence in Central Asia.
IMPLICATIONS: In this new world order, Russia’s visibly declining hegemony over Central Asian security and culture would be restored, possibly by force, and to judge from ongoing economic trends, under Chinese sufferance. While this may well be a delusional dream, it now holds sway in Moscow and represents another desperate effort to hold on to the wrecks of empire. As Sergei Radchenko demonstrates in his superb account of Soviet foreign policy, Moscow cannot claim the mantle of great power and imperial status if it lacks willing clients. Therefore, it will consistently attempt to subordinate its neighbors, including Central Asia.
China shares this imperial world view. Its methods in Russia and Central Asia are primarily economic, yet no less coercive than Russia’s more heavy-handed approach. However, Beijing is happy for now to let Russia bear security burdens that it prefers to avoid, given the challenges it faces in Korea, the South China Sea, and India. And it certainly welcomes Russia’s growing dependence on China in economics and as provider of strategic technologies.
If this interpretation of the SCO gains traction, it entails several challenges to Central Asian members and India. First, the vision of the SCO as a Sino-Russian artifact of a multipolar order entails a diminution of Central Asian states’ sovereignty as free international actors. Beijing and Moscow will seek to coerce them into following their agenda, not a Central Asian one. The idea that the SCO is merely an artefact of a great power struggle over multipolarity and spheres of influence not only justifies pressure upon Central Asia to oust U.S. and European presence and influence from the region. It also aims to curtail Central Asia’s increasing outreach to the West and vice versa that is now finally taking place. This exclusionary Sino-Russian approach can only lead to economic isolation, stagnation, and subordination to Moscow and Beijing when both those economies have long since entered upon their own periods of stagnation.
Second, the triumph of this view of the SCO enhances Russia’s and China’s economic leverage on Central Asia. It allows Moscow to continue threatening Central Asian migrants and economies by playing the increasingly popular anti-migrant card in Russian politics. Beijing will similarly employ the leverage it possesses through trade and investment deals to coerce local governments into an inferior position, especially if other alternatives are unavailable.
Third, Russian and possibly Chinese military threats, particularly against Kazakhstan, will increase. And fourth, at the same time Moscow and China will collaborate at China’s behest, given Russia’s extensive dependence on China, to exclude India from future major trade and transport routes as China has already done. Thus, the SCO will become a vehicle whose purposes also comprise the stifling of India’s growing power and interests in Central Asia. One form these processes will likely take is already underway whereby Russia will seek alignment with Afghanistan, ostensibly to stop terrorism and reaffirm its military hegemony over Central Asia. Indeed, its ambassador to Kabul now proclaims an alliance between the two states, an alliance that can only suppress Indian and Central Asian interests in expanding ties.
As part of this projected reorientation of the SCO, therefore, it will be subordinated to the exigencies of great power rivalry with the U.S. while the Sino-Indian rivalry in Asia will be institutionalized within it. The consequences may to some degree be unforeseeable; but are unlikely to redound to the benefit of Central Asian governments.
CONCLUSIONS: For interested parties, i.e. not only regional governments, but also the U.S. and the EU, it is necessary to prevent the resubordination of Central Asia to the renewed imperial fantasies of Russia and China. This entails constant high and low-level interaction among these states with regard to critical issues: terrorism, which clearly remains a real threat, future ties to Afghanistan, bilateral and multilateral energy, trade, transportation routes, rare earths, environmental reclamation projects, education, and defense cooperation. Only by such means can the West and its leading organizations contribute to the preservation of regional peace, trade, investment, growth, and mitigate looming environmental threats in Central Asia.
India too must step up its game here and realize the long-held but unfulfilled promise of enhanced ties with and support for Central Asia by carrying out an increasing number of projects on this same agenda with local governments. This would forestall a Chinese-led but Russian-supported effort to curtail Central Asian ties with both the West and Asia’s other key players. The newly announced South Korean plan for increased ties with Central Asia exemplifies what could be done.
Finally, both the West and leading Asian powers should lend growing support to the rising trend among Central Asian states to enhance their mutual and regional cooperation. To the degree that foreign support and local perceptions foster regional cooperation on the many challenges facing Central Asia, they enhance local and regional capabilities while also raising the cost to Beijing and Moscow of interference in Central Asia. In other words, Western support for individual country projects and especially for multilateral cooperative projects encompassing the agenda presented above, are win-win and mutually beneficial. They build peace, economic growth and development, and preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Central Asian states that is openly at risk from both Beijing and Moscow.
Enhancing Western influence and regional cooperation are proven ways of reducing conflict whereas spheres of influence invariably foster neo-imperial rivalries. The masquerade of Sino-Russian multipolarity will not have different results if we neglect Central Asia. Instead, we will only increase the costs to that region and to our own interests.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fprpi.org.
Svante E. Cornell
July 31, 2024
A key development in Greater Central Asian affairs is the rise of Middle Powers, states that are displaying considerable agency in shaping the region surrounding them and making their mark on international relations writ large. The first Middle Power to emerge and be recognized as such is Kazakhstan, through a combination of it economic might and its strategic approach to foreign relations. As Central Asia’s outside partners reassess strategies toward the region that have been rendered obsolete by events in the past several years, this new reality should feature centrally in approaches to the region.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.
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