In early June, former Kyrgyz prime minister and current opposition leader Felix Kulov proposed that Kyrgyzstan join Russia in a confederation. Kulov’s initiative instantly attracted public attention to his persona and sparked widespread discussions in the Kyrgyz and Russian media.

By joining Russia, Kulov suggests the resolution of two pressing problems in Kyrgyzstan. First, alleviating the north-south divide, and second, improving the national economy. In justifying his proposal, Kulov referred to the 150-year history of Kyrgyz-Russian diplomatic relations and the wish of the Kyrgyz people at all times to build stronger ties with Russia.

Today, as Kulov asserted, hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyz citizens depend on work in Russia and are ready to vote for joining the former imperial center. He also claimed that Russia will not decline the proposal if Kyrgyzstan’s decision is confirmed through a national referendum. Kulov intends to collect the necessary 300,000 signatures to organize a referendum this fall.

After failing to force president Kurmanbek Bakiyev to step down during the April 11-19 mass demonstrations, Kulov fell out of the political life for almost two months. Some Kyrgyz experts believe that by proposing a Russian-Kyrgyz confederation, Kulov tried to preempt similar intentions towards Russia on Bakiyev’s part.

Kulov’s proposal was met with sarcasm and skepticism in Russia. Mainly the Russian media responded to Kulov, while government officials ignored the proposal altogether. The Russian newspaper Trud published an article titled “In Kyrgyzstan, they don’t know what confederation means”, referring at the improbability of a Russian-Kyrgyz confederation. Another Russian newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, accused Kulov of campaigning in Kyrgyzstan “at the expense of Russia”. Russian political expert Aleksey Malashenko refuted Kulov’s initiative out of hand, calling it another “dead model” of regional cooperation. Some Russian newspapers discussed the possibility of stronger integration of Kyrgyzstan with Russia on par with other pro-Moscow states like Kazakhstan, Armenia, Tajikistan and Belarus.

At the June 25 press conference in Bishkek, the Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Nikolay Bordyuzha, stated that “such steps [in integration of two nations] are justified and realistic in regards to security goals. But I think, the form is not important, the content is.” In the future Russia might rely on Kulov’s idea in strengthening the CSTO and other similar regional organizations.

In Kyrgyzstan, Kulov’s idea of a confederation met with a mixed reaction. It tested the limits of even the most pro-Russian Kyrgyz politicians. Those who voiced their opinion on the matter were cynical about Russia’s actual interest in having Kyrgyzstan as a dependent country. According to commentaries made in the Kyrgyz press, Russia is able to sustain its geopolitical weight even without the former Soviet states. It is by far a stronger international actor today than in the early 1990s.

Kyrgyzstan’s greater integration with Russia could be fostered at the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit on August 16. Indeed, Kulov’s proposal also impacts positively on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s public rating in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. It indicates that Moscow does not need to play hardball to maintain the loyalty of the current Kyrgyz government, of Kyrgyz society for that matter.

Kulov’s proposal granted pro-Russian state officials the opportunity to show their appreciation of the northern neighbor before the SCO summit. Speaker of Parliament Marat Sultanov compared Kulov’s idea of a Russian-Kyrgyz confederation with the European Union, while First Deputy State Secretary Adakhan Modumarov insisted that a legal base for such a union is necessary. Last December, Murat Zhurayev, a Kyrgyz parliamentarian from Batken, suggested entering the ruble zone in order to promote economic growth in Kyrgyzstan.

The most ardent opponents of Kulov’s initiative warn that a confederation with Russia will inevitably lead to the loss of state sovereignty. However, the popular newspaper Bely Parohod, which shares most of Kulov’s views, argues that Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty is rather symbolic as the country depends on its larger neighbors. The newspaper suggested that joining Russia is inevitable, but the process needs “to be a clean [initiative], not personified around any political figure”.

Collecting 300,000 signatures to organize a referendum in Kyrgyzstan is not difficult if there are sufficient financial and human resources for the project. However, the referendum itself might turn out to be a failure, being short of a majority vote. The government will indeed try to prevent the organization of the referendum, in order to prevent Kulov’s growing popularity.

Yet Kulov himself seems to be more interested in the process rather than in the ends of his initiative. He managed to re-enter political life after his April fiasco. As Kulov warned, if the government intervenes into his initiative to organize a referendum, he will once again mobilize masses against the president and parliament.

Ironically, compared to Kulov’s idea, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev’s suggestion to create a Central Asian Union first with Kyrgyzstan and later with the entire region did not provoke the same degree of discussion.

Kulov’s suggestion is also an indirect contribution to the Kyrgyz government’s accumulating fissures with the United States over the military base in Bishkek. As the SCO summit approaches, the Kyrgyz government is caught between Russia and the United States over its military cooperation. Anti-American views have been on the rise in Kyrgyzstan since the March 24 Tulip Revolution in 2005. Had this suggestion arrived when Kyrgyz-U.S. relations were at their zenith in 2001-2004, Russia might have reacted differently.