As Georgia announced its intention to leave the CIS, its current chair, Kyrgyzstan, might well find itself expected to deviate from its habitual practice of maneuvering between the interests of Russia and the U.S.. It may be pushed to bring about a relative crystallization of its foreign policy.  Harboring military air bases of both Russia and the U.S., only a short distance from each other near Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan will need a special shrewdness at the SCO summit in Dushanbe this August not to spoil its relationship with either side; and contribute its part to the future of the CIS in a summit in September.

Yet, Russia’s military victory in the conflict, vividly highlighted in the mostly pro-Russian media outlets in Kyrgyzstan, will likely push President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s position a good deal closer to that of Moscow.

From the onset of the conflict in the Caucasus, Bakiev chose to be rather aloof and decided not to make hasty comments. Taking a short vacation on the peak of military conflict in Georgia, Bakiev unofficially met with Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan, on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul. Apparently anxious of making untimely comments, they both shied away, equivocally stating that “such a conflict must be handled by international law and exclusively through diplomatic means.”

After the meeting, Nazarbayev, who often positions Kazakhstan as a regional leader and advocates the creation of a Central Asia Union, described the CIS as “amorphous” and stressed its lack of leverages and mechanisms for intervention in conflicts such as that between Russia and Georgia. He also stated that all the CIS members are against separatism and that this sort of complicated international questions should be solved peacefully through negotiations. “There is no way for a military solution,” he stressed.

Alikbek Djekshenkulov, a former Foreign Minister and head of a local Think Tank, predicted that the CIS summit in Bishkek will be fateful and decisive.  In his view, Georgia’s withdrawal from CIS membership will trigger at least a polarization within the CIS, as Russia’s perspective will force its members to define their position on the CIS more clearly. At the same time, he argued that the best option for Kyrgyzstan is to support the CIS and participate in its institutional reforms, since Russia remains as a strategic partner despite the limited effectiveness of common economic projects.

Along with Russia’s popular First Channel, local mass media outlets tend to be overly pro-Russian as well. Channel Five, which fills a special space in local media outlets targeting mostly the Russian-speaking urban population, showed an interview with Valentin Vlasov, Russian Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, who talked about “Tbilisi’s criminal activities in South Ossetia” and lamented the activities of some states and international organizations “apparently dictated from outside.” Vlasov also implicitly warned that “careless conformation could endanger people of these [Central Asian] states to the extent the people of Georgia has become instruments of foreign politics.”

The objectivity of Kyrgyz politicians sent to South Ossetia to provide field information is generally questionable, as their reports largely derived from Russian sources. For instance, Russia’s RBK Daily has role-modeled Kyrgyz delegates for helping cement the principally critical position of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) towards Georgia. Invited to South Ossetia by the public fund For Russia for “independent monitoring, ”Murat Juraev, a parliamentarian from the Social Democratic Party, reasoned that the existence of disputed territories in Central Asia and about one million Kyrgyz workers in Russia makes Kyrgyzstan a supporter of Russian policies.

Amidst the intense flow of Russian news holding the U.S. responsible for staging a proxy war in Georgia, the confiscation of an arms cache by Kyrgyz forces in a private house rented by U.S. citizens obviously harmed the image of the U.S., and especially its military air base mission there. Notwithstanding the U.S. embassy’s statement that they are to be used for an antiterrorist exercise, information confirmed belatedly by the National Security Service (NSS), local analysts were keen to interpret this as a warning for the Kyrgyz government, in case it jumps on the Kremlin’s bandwagon (Reporter Bishkek newspaper). More than that, the circumstances under which the weapons were found have eagerly spawned assumptions of anti-American feelings. The blame could be placed on both the US, for allowing weapons in a private house, and on the Kyrgyz security forces, which often lack coordination.

As a result, on August 8 the pro-government Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan (CPK) demanded that the government consider in September a withdrawal of the U.S. airbase from Manas Airport. The CPK argued that “cooperation with the U.S. most of all spoils the image of Kyrgyzstan in the eyes of our traditional allies like Russia, China, and other Islamic states.”  As the CPK often cites, the rudimentary sources of anti-U.S. feelings usually stem from incidents involving the reckless behavior of military vehicles in Bishkek, the killing of a local truck driver, and the dumping of air petrol on farmlands, which are frequently seen as going unpunished, and usually receiving undue attention of media outlets.

A month ago, Bakiyev made an unofficial visit to Moscow. Against the background of the coming SCO and CIS summits, President Medvedev suggested Bakiev to “sync watches,” and discussed unfinished Russian projects in Kyrgyzstan. Apparently, Moscow is making an effort to strengthen ties with Bishkek by boosting cooperation in banking, mining industry, and weapons manufacturing. During his late spring visit to the Kyrgyz Dastan Corporation, located on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul and once part of the Soviet military industrial complex manufacturing naval weapons, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy boasted of the Russian Navy’s active return to the “world oceans.”  However, military experts commented that this venture had political overtones, given Dastan’s limited capacity.

Nonetheless, in light of the Russian-Georgian war, Kyrgyzstan, once characterized as part of the revolutionary family, is likely to find itself thrown closer to Russia and forced to restate its arguments. Obviously, issuing an official statement and reaching a unanimous conclusion among members of the Russian-led CIS will be difficult. Kumar Bekbolotov, Central Asian program director of the London-based Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), argued that the CIS, as has long been claimed, has worn off, pointing at frequent failures of both negotiations and their implementations within the framework of the CIS.