Wednesday, 12 November 2008

NEW ROUND OF DEMONSTRATIONS STARTS IN TBILISI

Published in Field Reports

By Niklas Nilsson (11/12/2008 issue of the CACI Analyst)

On November 7, one year after the Georgian police’s crackdown on demonstrators in Tbilisi, parts of the Georgian opposition and their supporters gathered for protest rallies against the authorities. The rallies were organized by the New Rights Party, the Conservative Party, the People’s Party, the Labor Party, and the Movement for United Georgia, as well as several independent politicians, representing most of the parties in the opposition coalition which is boycotting parliament following the May Parliamentary elections.

On November 7, one year after the Georgian police’s crackdown on demonstrators in Tbilisi, parts of the Georgian opposition and their supporters gathered for protest rallies against the authorities. The rallies were organized by the New Rights Party, the Conservative Party, the People’s Party, the Labor Party, and the Movement for United Georgia, as well as several independent politicians, representing most of the parties in the opposition coalition which is boycotting parliament following the May Parliamentary elections.

On November 6, these parties issued a leaflet stating that November 7 would mark the beginning of recurring protests against the Georgian government, and outlining demands. These demands include an independent investigation of events during the August war, freedom of broadcast media (mainly referring to the Imedi TV channel), reforms in the Georgian election code and the release of 16 persons arrested on criminal charges during the events one year ago.

However, the main objective outlined is a change of government, something the opposition intends to achieve through demanding reruns of the January Presidential, and the May Parliamentary elections. The opposition terms both elections rigged and thus claims the government has depleted its legitimacy with the Georgian people. The opposition is nevertheless divided on how such changes are to be achieved. While some promote “gradual changes” and have opened for international mediation and negotiations with the authorities, others demand the president’s immediate resignation. 

The opposition has also outlined a schedule for their continued activities. This includes the setting up of a “united political organization” to take the lead in continued protests and potentially including unnamed figures of the United National Movement, demonstrations outside Parliament in January to demand new Presidential elections and intensified protests starting April 9 if demands are not met. 

It can however be questioned whether the opposition will prove able to gather significant support for these activities. Attendees at the rally on November 7 were estimated to between 10,000 and 15,000, thus a little over one tenth of the crowds gathered at the peak of the demonstrations last year. Also, recent opinion polls indicate that while public support for President Saakashvili may have dwindled over the last year, support for the opposition parties as well as for protests, are considerably lower.

The Georgian political climate has been extremely polarized since the beginning of organized opposition protests in September last year. During the August war and in its immediate aftermath, most political forces nevertheless toned down their otherwise quite harsh rhetoric, limiting their criticism of the government to questioning some of its actions during the war. However, it now seems that things are turning back to normal and that the coming months will again expose the severe divisions in Georgian politics. 

The opposition may nevertheless be embarking on a complex balancing between pushing its demands on the government while at the same time coming forth as credible supporters of the Georgian state in the aftermath of Russia’s August invasion of the country. The chosen tactic seems to be to connect the two issues of regime change and national defense against Russia. Protests on November 7 featured the slogan “Stop Russia, stop Misha”, and a speech delivered by Zviad Dzidziguri of the Conservative party highlighted the skepticism voiced by some representatives of Georgia’s western allies after the war. Thus, the Georgian president was portrayed as representing authoritarianism and recklessness, as responsible for Georgia’s loss of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and his remaining in power as hampering Georgia’s integration with the West, and serving Russian interests. It is likely that differing portrayals of Russian interests in Georgian politics will continue to be exchanged in the coming period. The government has so far focused on the need for unity in Georgian politics in order to face the external threat, but may also be tempted to accuse certain opposition politicians of collaboration with Russia, as was done during the events last November. 

President Saakashvili as well as other high Georgian officials declared that the events one year ago were an important lesson to all actors involved, including the authorities, that dialogue across the political spectrum is needed, and pleaded for continued national unity after the war. The Georgian government will nevertheless again face the test of maintaining the credibility of its own democratization efforts, also in the face of a vocal opposition. Its ability to offer reconciliation and deal with the country’s political polarization in a peaceful and democratic manner will be crucial for maintaining its good standing with its Western partners, among some of which the government’s actions during both November 2007 and the August war are questioned.
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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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