The New Challenge to the SCO
THE NEW CHALLENGE TO THE SCO
By: Stephen Blank
The recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Astana reveals that both Moscow and Beijing are seeking to reformat the organization in order to meet their global rather than its original regional goals. That process represents a serious challenge to the foreign policy autonomy and interests of Central Asian states and probably to regional security. As the center of gravity of world politics shifts ever more to Asia, the role and importance of Central Asia is likely to grow. These trends should be recognized and acted upon to assure that Central Asia does not become a closed sphere of Sino-Russian influence, which would retard its growth and transform it into a breeding ground for conflict.
BACKGROUND: The SCO was first set up to create an institutional framework by which China’s growing importance in and to Central Asia could be regulated. At the same time, it also constituted a forum for Central Asian governments whereby they could address not only each other but also Russia and China concerning their interests and needs and where all the parties could reach agreement on how to contend with shared threats, e.g. the genuine and continuing threat of terrorism. As such the SCO gradually evolved into a viable regional security forum where both Moscow and Beijing could present or implement their regional security initiatives and Central Asian states could present their interests and needs. Thus, it functioned to satisfy all the members’ needs as a purely regional security organization.
However, as world politics evolved towards a world order characterized primarily by great power rivalry and even threats of nuclear confrontation, Russia and China clearly intend to impart a wholly new purpose and direction to the SCO that threatens the interests of the Central Asian states. Membership now includes India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus. These additions to the SCO’s roster are primarily attributable to Sino-Russian maneuvers – great power calculations that outweigh regional concerns. Moreover, these new members of the SCO have also brought their rivalries, especially those between India and Pakistan over Afghanistan and Kashmir, and India and China over China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), into the SCO, probably rendering the organization less effective as a security provider. Finally, Russia’s war in Ukraine has also undermined its reputation as a security provider in Central Asia, not least because high-ranking scholars like Sergei Karaganov and officials regularly make veiled and even unsubtle threats against Kazakhstan, which they claim to be part of Russia.
Recent trends, as expressed at the SCO summit in Astana and other high-level Russo-Chinese gatherings, indicate that both Russia and China have abandoned the idea that the SCO serves mainly as a regional security institution. In numerous speeches, Putin, Xi, and spokesmen for their policies now openly state that the SCO, like the BRICS, manifests a new and evolving form of multipolar politics led by Moscow and Beijing, which herald the rise of the East and South against a supposedly decrepit West. In this self-serving ideological depiction of the emerging world order, these formerly regional or economic organizations function to attack the West and validate Moscow’s and Beijing’s hegemony over weaker neighbors like Central Asia. This hegemony entails an unquestioned division of the world into spheres of influence and the extreme minimization of foreign influence in Central Asia.
IMPLICATIONS: In this new world order, Russia’s visibly declining hegemony over Central Asian security and culture would be restored, possibly by force, and to judge from ongoing economic trends, under Chinese sufferance. While this may well be a delusional dream, it now holds sway in Moscow and represents another desperate effort to hold on to the wrecks of empire. As Sergei Radchenko demonstrates in his superb account of Soviet foreign policy, Moscow cannot claim the mantle of great power and imperial status if it lacks willing clients. Therefore, it will consistently attempt to subordinate its neighbors, including Central Asia.
China shares this imperial world view. Its methods in Russia and Central Asia are primarily economic, yet no less coercive than Russia’s more heavy-handed approach. However, Beijing is happy for now to let Russia bear security burdens that it prefers to avoid, given the challenges it faces in Korea, the South China Sea, and India. And it certainly welcomes Russia’s growing dependence on China in economics and as provider of strategic technologies.
If this interpretation of the SCO gains traction, it entails several challenges to Central Asian members and India. First, the vision of the SCO as a Sino-Russian artifact of a multipolar order entails a diminution of Central Asian states’ sovereignty as free international actors. Beijing and Moscow will seek to coerce them into following their agenda, not a Central Asian one. The idea that the SCO is merely an artefact of a great power struggle over multipolarity and spheres of influence not only justifies pressure upon Central Asia to oust U.S. and European presence and influence from the region. It also aims to curtail Central Asia’s increasing outreach to the West and vice versa that is now finally taking place. This exclusionary Sino-Russian approach can only lead to economic isolation, stagnation, and subordination to Moscow and Beijing when both those economies have long since entered upon their own periods of stagnation.
Second, the triumph of this view of the SCO enhances Russia’s and China’s economic leverage on Central Asia. It allows Moscow to continue threatening Central Asian migrants and economies by playing the increasingly popular anti-migrant card in Russian politics. Beijing will similarly employ the leverage it possesses through trade and investment deals to coerce local governments into an inferior position, especially if other alternatives are unavailable.
Third, Russian and possibly Chinese military threats, particularly against Kazakhstan, will increase. And fourth, at the same time Moscow and China will collaborate at China’s behest, given Russia’s extensive dependence on China, to exclude India from future major trade and transport routes as China has already done. Thus, the SCO will become a vehicle whose purposes also comprise the stifling of India’s growing power and interests in Central Asia. One form these processes will likely take is already underway whereby Russia will seek alignment with Afghanistan, ostensibly to stop terrorism and reaffirm its military hegemony over Central Asia. Indeed, its ambassador to Kabul now proclaims an alliance between the two states, an alliance that can only suppress Indian and Central Asian interests in expanding ties.
As part of this projected reorientation of the SCO, therefore, it will be subordinated to the exigencies of great power rivalry with the U.S. while the Sino-Indian rivalry in Asia will be institutionalized within it. The consequences may to some degree be unforeseeable; but are unlikely to redound to the benefit of Central Asian governments.
CONCLUSIONS: For interested parties, i.e. not only regional governments, but also the U.S. and the EU, it is necessary to prevent the resubordination of Central Asia to the renewed imperial fantasies of Russia and China. This entails constant high and low-level interaction among these states with regard to critical issues: terrorism, which clearly remains a real threat, future ties to Afghanistan, bilateral and multilateral energy, trade, transportation routes, rare earths, environmental reclamation projects, education, and defense cooperation. Only by such means can the West and its leading organizations contribute to the preservation of regional peace, trade, investment, growth, and mitigate looming environmental threats in Central Asia.
India too must step up its game here and realize the long-held but unfulfilled promise of enhanced ties with and support for Central Asia by carrying out an increasing number of projects on this same agenda with local governments. This would forestall a Chinese-led but Russian-supported effort to curtail Central Asian ties with both the West and Asia’s other key players. The newly announced South Korean plan for increased ties with Central Asia exemplifies what could be done.
Finally, both the West and leading Asian powers should lend growing support to the rising trend among Central Asian states to enhance their mutual and regional cooperation. To the degree that foreign support and local perceptions foster regional cooperation on the many challenges facing Central Asia, they enhance local and regional capabilities while also raising the cost to Beijing and Moscow of interference in Central Asia. In other words, Western support for individual country projects and especially for multilateral cooperative projects encompassing the agenda presented above, are win-win and mutually beneficial. They build peace, economic growth and development, and preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Central Asian states that is openly at risk from both Beijing and Moscow.
Enhancing Western influence and regional cooperation are proven ways of reducing conflict whereas spheres of influence invariably foster neo-imperial rivalries. The masquerade of Sino-Russian multipolarity will not have different results if we neglect Central Asia. Instead, we will only increase the costs to that region and to our own interests.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fprpi.org.
Nuclear Power Plant in Uzbekistan: Energy and Geopolitics
By Farkhod Tolipov
August 21, 2024
During a state visit of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to Uzbekistan in May 2024, after his re-election, it was officially announced that the long-anticipated construction of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) received a green light. A corresponding agreement was signed between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan. This decision caused wide public debate about the NPP, regarding its expediency, the environmental and security risks, as well as the geopolitical consequences associated with it. At the same time, the project signifies Uzbekistan’s growing dependence on Russia and a more pro-Russian drift in Tashkent’s foreign policy.
BACKGROUND: The first signals of the possible construction of an NPP in Uzbekistan appeared several years ago. It was then stipulated and justified with reference to the lack of sufficient gas reserves in the country. This pretext surprised many economic experts, political analysts as well as the public since Uzbekistan has for a long time, even during the Soviet period, occupied the highest positions in international rankings of gas reserves and gas production.
The issue of dwindling gas reserves is a big and ambiguous question because neither the government nor specialists have provided convincing explanations for the exhaustion of gas fields in Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, frequent blackouts have become a “normal” phenomenon during last two-three years – roughly corresponding to the period during which the NPP project has been officially promoted. Sudden and frequent blackouts taking place across the country have created the suspicion that they are not so much caused by the inability of existing energy infrastructure to satisfy the country’s growing energy needs and a lack of gas reserves, but are man-made and deliberate in order to convince people that there is no alternative to an NPP.
However, the overall agreements between Uzbekistan and Russia regarding the NPP, including the costs of the plant, environmental aspects, the disposal and utilization of nuclear waste, and many other concomitant questions of interest to the public and media remain opaque and secretive. It was in this context that Putin and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev announced the official start of the NPP construction project.
Initially, the NPP project was intended to consist of 2 large reactors of 1.2 Gigawatt each, at a cost estimated to US$ 11 billion. However, it has now been decided that the NPP will be a small plant consisting of 6 small reactors of 55 Megawatt each. Overall, the electricity that will be produced by the NPP is supposed to constitute about 15 percent of the total energy produced in the country. The NPP is supposed to become operational in 2033.
IMPLICATIONS: Proponents of the NPP construction argue that nuclear energy is widely used in the world, pointing to France, Germany, Japan, the U.S. and others. According to them, constructing the NPP is in Uzbekistan’s strategic interests and an instrument of sustainable development, since it will positively affect both economic growth and the population’s living standards. Moreover, they say that nuclear power is the only source of energy generation that meets all three pillars of the so-called energy trilemma established by the International Energy Agency – reliability of energy infrastructure; availability of energy for the population and industry; and no harmful effect on the environment.
While these assertions seem aimed to calm the excited public opinion, they do not withstand critical counterarguments. Numerous physicists, environmentalists, energy experts, political scientists and public activists have raised their voices against the NPP. In particular, according to estimates, it will be more expensive to produce electric energy in small reactors than large ones. Uzbekistan will face a large financial burden that will be carried by consumers. Also, according to estimates, Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sources can fully satisfy the country’s energy needs even without the NPP.
Meanwhile, multiple questions related to the construction and operation of the NPP as well as its geopolitical implications have not been addressed and no transparent calculations of key aspects of the NPP’s operation have been provided. These include the enrichment of Uranium from U²¹⁸ to U²³²; the system for cooling the reactor; the utilization of nuclear waste; the overall cost of the project; security aspects; as well as the increased reliance on a Russia that wages a war of aggression against Ukraine and threatens other former Soviet republics with its neo-imperial policy. In addition, the digitalization of the NPP operation raises questions regarding possible cyber-security aspects of the plant, which will definitely be exposed to such threats.
Importantly, this type of small NPP does not exist even in Russia itself, which uses small reactors only for icebreaker engines. Thus, the NPP in Uzbekistan will in fact constitute a first experiment with a number of risks attached.
When journalists and pundits began to inquire about the details of the NPP project and requested relevant information from governmental agencies, they received no response. To the contrary, media organizations were told by authorities that they should refrain from highlighting topics relating to the NPP. Despite the reluctance of government agencies to communicate information on the NPP and attempts to curtail media coverage, social networks and independent experts do discuss the issue and seek to keep it on the public agenda. A special group was even created on Facebook titled “Uzbekistanis are against the NPP.” Simultaneously, a similar NPP project is being discussed in Kazakhstan. In contrast to Tashkent, Astana has officially made it clear that a referendum will be held on NPP construction. However, in Uzbekistan, the decision comes before its justification.
The social and political drama related to the NPP has created the impression that the project corresponds to Russia’s interests rather than those of Uzbekistan. The enthusiasm with which Russia promotes this project cannot be considered and understood independently from the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Indeed, the NPP will serve triple objectives for Moscow. First, it will constitute political leverage for exerting pressure upon Uzbekistan. Second, it will provide one among very few instruments for mitigating economic decline and crisis in Russia due to international economic and financial sanctions. Third, it will help creating a false image that Russia is not isolated in world politics and has partners and allies. Given the establishment of a partnership in nuclear energy, Uzbekistan will hardly vote against Russia at future UNGA sessions.
It should be recalled that since 1997, Central Asia is proclaimed a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). The NWFZ by its nature and essence is a broad concept; its ultimate goal is to safeguard the region against any form of nuclear threat. The question therefore arises whether the NPP can be considered a dual-purpose object, which could in certain circumstances be transformed into a weapon? After Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia NPP, this question cannot be ignored and obscured.
Instead, Uzbekistan’s government seems to reiterate Napoleon’s saying: “One jumps into the fray, then figures out what to do next,” or “You commit yourself, then you see.”
CONCLUSIONS: While a number of countries utilize NPPs to produce electricity, most countries resolve their electricity needs by developing alternative energy sources such as solar, wind and hydro. Many countries are also cancelling their nuclear energy programs in favor of renewable sources. The straightforward and very simplistic attempts by proponents of Uzbekistan’s NPP to propagate for the project, in combination with the secrecy displayed by Uzbek authorities, are not only unconvincing but also raise suspicions that Tashkent engages in a mutual geopolitical gamble with Moscow.
The agreement signed between Tashkent and Moscow on the NPP lacks due scientific elaboration and national debates concerning all aspects and risks involved in the deal. Many experts, media as well members of the public are now raising their voices against the project, claiming that Uzbekistan is losing its sovereignty and independence and falling into dependence on Russia.
Indeed, this issue is far from routine and conventional, just like a nuclear weapon is considered a non-conventional weapon. Accordingly, policy in this special area also should be unconventional, taking into account the vital national interests of the country.
AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Research Institution “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own.
June 23 Makahchkala Attacks: Implications for the Kremlin
By Emil A. Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev
July 3, 2024
On June 23, a series of coordinated attacks were carried out in Dagestan’s two largest cities Makhachkala and Derbent, targeting Orthodox churches, synagogues, and a traffic police post. The attacks left 26 people dead (including five attackers) and dozens injured. This attack signaled the apparent revival of the jihadist scene in Russia’s largest and demographically most populous North Caucasus republic, fuelled in part by increasing antisemitic tension and militarism due to the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This new upsurge of violence can also be attributed to the worsening socio-economic conditions in the republic, the over-engagement of the law enforcement and security services with the war in Ukraine, and the accumulation of general discontent among Dagestani youth with limited channels for peaceful expression.
K-Silk Road: Korea Unveils New Strategy for Central Asia
By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu
July 3, 2024
President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea recently visited the Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Prior to his tour, he introduced the “K-Silk Road” initiative, highlighting his role in guiding Korea’s future interactions with the region. While this initiative builds upon Korea’s longstanding policies, it signifies a desire to forge a new chapter in Central Asian relations. Despite its shortcomings and some neglected areas, this initiative is a significant step forward in the context of regional relations.
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Staff Publications
Silk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, Greater Central Asia as A Component of U.S. Global Strategy, October 2024.
Analysis Laura Linderman, "Rising Stakes in Tbilisi as Elections Approach," Civil Georgia, September 7, 2024.
Analysis Mamuka Tsereteli, "U.S. Black Sea Strategy: The Georgian Connection", CEPA, February 9, 2024.
Silk Road Paper Svante E. Cornell, ed., Türkiye's Return to Central Asia and the Caucasus, July 2024.
Book Svante E. Cornell, ed., "The Changing Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus" AFPC Press/Armin LEar, 2023.
Silk Road Paper Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, Stepping up to the “Agency Challenge”: Central Asian Diplomacy in a Time of Troubles, July 2023.
Silk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, U.S. Policy in Central Asia through Central Asian Eyes, May 2023.