By Pauline Le Grand

This Saturday, on October 26th, Georgia, will decide its future trajectory in parliamentary elections. The country stands at a crossroads and must decide whether to continue towards a European future or turn towards authoritarianism. After achieving candidate status for the European Union in 2023, the passing of the “foreign agent” law by the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party raised concerns over the country’s democratic progression and stalled its EU ascension. The GD remains a strong contender for this election, especially in Georgia’s more conservative regions, and risks steering Georgia away from the EU for good. This election will not only test the resilience of Georgia’s democratic institutions but will also reveal the country’s broader geopolitical alignment in an increasingly polarized region.

BACKGROUND:  On October 26th, Georgians will head to the polls to decide their future. This election is one of the most significant in Georgia's history as it will determine whether Georgia will remain on its European path or succumb to the Kremlin's sphere of influence. In December 2023, Georgia was granted candidate status for the European Union on the understanding that the country would work to make significant changes towards accession. Yet, since then, Georgia appears to have done just the opposite and its accession process has been frozen. In April 2024, the current government, led by the Georgian Dream (GD) party, passed the law on transparency of foreign influence, referred to as a copy-paste of Russia's foreign agent law. Civil society organizations (CSOs) receiving more than 20 percent of funds from overseas had to register on the Government's list as they were deemed to be carrying out the interests of a foreign power. The bill was first proposed in 2023 but withdrawn due to popular discontent. This year, despite promising to not revisit the law, despite even fiercer popular opposition gathering thousands of Tbilisi citizens in front of Parliament for weeks, and despite pro-European President Salome Zurabishvili's veto, the government adopted the bill on May 28th. Of an estimated 300,000 CSOs in Georgia, only 476 CSOs registered, with the others ignoring the law in protest. They preferred to wait for the government's investigation and resulting hefty fines with the hope that the upcoming election will lead to a reevaluation of the bill. The government also passed an anti-LGBTQ+ propaganda law in September as part of a legislative package 'On Protection of Family Values and Minors'. The law is a clear violation of freedom of expression and assembly. The Georgian Dream party has promised that if re-elected, it will effectively ban all opposition groups and turn Georgia into a single-party state. The GD, backed by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has been in power for the last twelve years and is determined to maintain its hold of the government. Despite the GD's apparent authoritarian turn and seeming unpopularity, it is projected to obtain a significant percentage of the vote. The question is whether it will secure enough votes for a supermajority, which would enable it to amend the constitution freely, distancing Georgia further from democracy and ultimately from the European Union.

IMPLICATIONS: In early October, the Georgian Dream launched an incredibly successful poster campaign across the country. While the capital of Georgia is relatively progressive and anti-GD, 70 percent of voters are registered outside the capital. Regional voters are overall less critical of the current government, focused on issues of employment and wages, stability and peace, and are generally culturally conservative. Regional voters have higher turnout and are therefore key to the outcome of the election and to Georgian Dream's constitutional super-majority (3/4 of Parliament).

The Georgian Dream (GD) party's rise to power was viewed by some as a positive turning point for Georgia. The party successfully ousted former President Mikheil Saakashvili, who had come to power following the 2003 Rose Revolution. Initially, Saakashvili's leadership brought significant improvements, including the removal of a corrupt elite, implementation of free-market reforms, and impressive economic growth. However, towards the end of his tenure, Saakashvili and his United National Movement (UNM) party tightened control over the political system, allowed elite corruption to spread, and expanded law enforcement powers excessively. Many felt that Saakashvili and the UNM had implemented changes too rapidly and aggressively. In contrast, GD's early years saw improvements in human rights and media freedom, along with a reduction in heavy-handed law enforcement. The party continues to benefit from lingering discontent with the Saakashvili era and fear of its potential return. GD has also cultivated support through social welfare programs, particularly pensions. Many voters worry these benefits might disappear if they don't support the ruling party. This fear is particularly pronounced in areas where electronic voting is being introduced, as some voters believe the new system compromises ballot secrecy, leading to pressure to vote for GD.

Fear remains a central and effective theme in Georgian Dream's (GD) election strategy. The mere possibility of losing pensions is often enough to drive voters to support GD. Similarly, the prospect of the United National Movement's (UNM) return motivates some Georgians to cast their ballots this Saturday. The UNM is inextricably linked to memories and fears of war.

Under Saakashvili's leadership in 2008, Russia invaded South Ossetia, a territory beginning just 40 kilometers from the capital. The 1992-1993 war with Abkhazia also lingers in the collective Georgian memory. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine reignited these concerns for Georgians, who strongly support Ukraine. The fear of another conflict weighs heavily on the minds of Georgians, particularly older voters who constitute the majority of the electorate – a fear GD has not hesitated to exploit.

A week after its initial poster campaign, GD launched a new series depicting Ukrainian buildings destroyed by Russian bombs alongside intact Georgian structures. This campaign sparked online outrage, with Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili commenting on Facebook: "How desperate and pitiful must you be to shamelessly and brazenly offer your people a poster crafted in the 'forges of the KGB'! 'With dignity' towards hell!" Nevertheless, GD's message remains potent; they warn that a vote for the opposition is a vote for war. Ivanishvili even suggested apologizing to South Ossetia for the 2008 war, which he blamed on Saakashvili's government. GD also hints at the possibility of reconciliation between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia with Russian assistance.

GD's successful fear campaigns stand in stark contrast to the opposition's apparent weaknesses. No single party emerges as particularly strong. Fragmented across four different coalitions, none offers a promising alternative. The opposition lacks connection with the regions; once outside Tbilisi, the already scarce opposition campaign posters virtually disappear. In some areas, voters have never even heard of certain opposition parties. Even in Tbilisi, those inclined to vote against GD struggle to choose a party, uncertain which might garner more votes.

CONCLUSION: This weekend's election will undoubtedly be a pivotal moment for Georgia's foreign policy orientation and liberal democracy, both within Georgia and more broadly. With a high risk of external interference, particularly from Russia, the stakes are high. Moldova's close call last weekend in the EU referendum serves as a reminder of the fragility of democracy and regional tendencies towards illiberalism. Still, the hope remains that Georgia's path will continue to align with Europe and the West, reflecting the population's overwhelming desire to join the European Union. Georgia is caught between an older population that remembers with great fear these two wars and is willing to back down to Russia and a politically active younger population who dreams of a liberal and European future. October 26th will show the rest of the world which pull is stronger today in Georgia.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Pauline Le Grand is a research intern at the Rondeli Foundation in Tbilisi, Georgia, where she researches Russia's influence in Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

By Stephen Blank

On September 18, 2024, Armenian authorities announced the exposure of an attempted coup orchestrated by Russia. Seven individuals were arrested, all of whom had been recruited, trained at a Russian military base, and financially supported by Russian officials. This recent incident sheds important light on Russia’s broader relations with its neighboring countries, extending beyond the Caucasus. Moscow seems to perceive most, if not all, post-Soviet states as susceptible to such destabilization. Although Armenia’s situation is shaped by its specific relationship with Russia, it may not be as exceptional as it initially appears.

BACKGROUND:  Coups have become a central tactic of the Russian state, both within the former Soviet Union and internationally. Through the use of proxies and pro-Moscow elements, Russia has been implicated in coup attempts across the Balkans, including in Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Greece. In Ukraine in 2004, pro-Russian actors poisoned Viktor Yushchenko during his presidential campaign. Additionally, Russia has employed proxies to further its interests in Georgia. Given the presence of Russian proxies, covert operatives, and pro-Russian factions across the states of the former Soviet Union, coupled with the overarching aim of restoring the Russian empire that drives Putin’s foreign policy, it is unsurprising that Moscow frequently resorts to organized strategies of state subversion, including coups. Armenia’s increasingly strained relationship with Russia stems from two key, interconnected events: the rise of the Pashinyan government during the 2018 revolution, which itself was a response to an attempt to manipulate the elections, and Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war against Azerbaijan. The 2018 revolution brought a democratizing agenda to Armenia, creating immediate friction with Russia, as Pashinyan’s government fundamentally contradicted the authoritarian model championed by Putin’s regime.  Despite these tensions, Armenia’s reliance on Russian energy and security, along with the presence of a Russian military base in Gyumri and Armenia’s efforts to maintain control over Nagorno-Karabakh, allowed for a functional, if strained, partnership between the two nations. However, the September 2020 war, which resulted in a decisive Azerbaijani victory, severely disrupted this relationship. During the conflict, Moscow did not offer military support to Armenia, while Turkey actively aided Azerbaijan and solidified an alliance with it. Russia’s primary focus was on securing its strategic interests, positioning its troops as peacekeepers between the warring sides after the fighting concluded, rather than directly assisting Armenia. This outcome has severely undermined the Armenia-Russia partnership, potentially beyond repair. As a result of Russia’s perceived “betrayal” and self-serving policies during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenian support for its alliance with Russia has steadily eroded. The Pashinyan government, despite facing nationalist opposition domestically, has largely accepted defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, relinquishing claims to the region, although the issue of a corridor connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave remains unresolved. Armenia’s growing discontent with Russia has manifested in its de facto withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Moscow’s attempt to create a defense alliance with intervention rights across the former Soviet Union. From Putin’s perspective, this shift is particularly alarming. Armenia has not only distanced itself from Russia but has also strengthened its ties with the U.S. and the EU, seeking economic assistance and exploring the possibility of acquiring Western (notably French) weapons. These actions jeopardize Armenia’s dependence on Russia and feed into Moscow’s persistent fear of Western influence in the strategically critical Caucasus region. In response, it is predictable that Russia would view Armenia’s pro-Western trajectory as a direct threat and seek to replace the Pashinyan government with a more compliant regime, one that would restore Yerevan’s subservience to Moscow’s geopolitical objectives. Simultaneously Russia has reversed its alliances, positioning itself as a partner of Azerbaijan, a sentiment that Azerbaijan reciprocates. 

IMPLICATIONS:  Given Russia’s continued military presence at its base in Gyumri and its broader leverage over Armenia, this is likely the most favorable arrangement Russia can achieve in the current geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus. When considered alongside the strong position of the increasingly pro-Russian Georgian Dream party, this alignment enhances Russia’s strategic hold in the region. However, these maneuvers leave Armenia in a precarious position. Despite its vulnerability, domestic public and elite opinion in Armenia is unlikely to support a return to dependence on Russia. Yet, the coup attempt reveals that even this seemingly optimal arrangement is insufficient for Moscow, which remains dissatisfied as long as Pashinyan’s government stays in power. Consequently, Russia sought to overthrow Pashinyan’s administration and install a regime more amenable to its interests. Russia’s coup attempt is driven by its desire to reassert itself as the dominant power over the three Transcaucasian states and reclaim its strategic advantage against regional rivals – namely Iran, Turkey, and the West. Moscow’s bid for control continues to shape its foreign policy not only in the Caucasus but also in its actions across the broader former Soviet space, as seen in its involvement in Ukraine and Central Asia. The potential rise of Armenian nationalists, who may be unreconciled to the losses in Nagorno-Karabakh, does not seem to alarm Moscow. On the contrary, Russia likely calculates that by fostering an unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it could restore its influence in the region. Perpetual instability would create a need for an external “security manager” – a role Russia would readily assume. Additionally, such a situation would undermine Western influence and its democratizing efforts in the region, allowing Russia to discredit and push out Western agendas. This would enable Moscow to recover as much of its former dominance in the region as is realistically feasible. The attempted coup in Armenia highlights several implications for both Russia and its neighboring states, as well as for other European states, such as those in the Balkans. It exposes the failure of Russia’s policies toward Armenia, demonstrating that Moscow is unable to provide security to its allies despite formal agreements. Additionally, Russia’s capacity to offer economic support has significantly diminished under the weight of international sanctions and the specter of stagflation.  This decline is not limited to Armenia but is also visible in Central Asia, where Russia, despite holding significant economic sway, is increasingly unable to compete with foreign rivals. Moscow’s self-proclaimed role as the primary security provider in Central Asia has been undermined, particularly following its invasion of Ukraine. Notably, no Central Asian state has endorsed Russia’s actions, and Kazakhstan has publicly distanced itself from Moscow’s goals, recognizing the implications for its own sovereignty, especially given the claims by Russian revisionists that northern Kazakhstan should be considered part of Russia. This broader regional disengagement reflects a weakening of Russia’s influence, as its inability to fulfill its security commitments and its shrinking economic capacity force its neighbors to seek alternatives. The coup attempt in Armenia, therefore, is symptomatic of a larger strategic failure that underscores Russia’s declining power and the increasingly fragile nature of its imperial reach across the former Soviet Union and beyond.

CONCLUSIONS:  Russia’s failure to deliver on its security promises, alongside its visibly declining economy, has paved the way for Central Asian states to pursue both greater regional cooperation and increased foreign engagement. These developments are perceived by Moscow as threatening, as they represent a shift away from Russian influence. The Armenian case exemplifies Russia’s inability to effectively wield its instruments of power in former Soviet republics, leaving it increasingly reliant on force and deceit to maintain control. Coups, such as those attempted in the Balkans and now Armenia, along with heightened espionage and sabotage efforts across Europe, have become the primary mechanisms through which Russia conducts its foreign policy. This dynamic threatens Europe and as seen in Armenia, also places the Caucasus and Central Asia under constant risk of destabilization. Putin’s regime depends on the systematic use of coercion and manipulation to survive. This reliance renders it a persistent threat to every European and post-Soviet government, from London to Dushanbe. The attempted coup in Armenia is a clear illustration of this reality and signals that further crises are inevitable as Putin’s regime struggles to sustain the remnants of an empire. The effort to oust Pashinyan is not an isolated incident but a warning of future instability, a symptom of Russia’s inability to accept that its imperial aspirations are no longer viable. Thus, the Armenian coup is likely the first in a series of crises that will unfold across Eurasia. It serves as a stark reminder that Russia’s weakening grip on its former territories will continue to generate turbulence. We can no longer claim ignorance of these possibilities; the warning signs are clear, and we have been forewarned of what lies ahead.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute at www.fpri.org.

By Vali Kaleji

Over the past decade, “Debt-trap Diplomacy” has emerged as a significant instrument for China to advance its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The inability of certain nations, such as Sri Lanka and various African countries, to repay their loans has resulted in China acquiring ownership of key infrastructure, including ports and mines. However, the repercussions of China’s debt-trap diplomacy vary across Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan’s debt to China is considered the most manageable within the region. Uzbekistan, benefiting from economic growth, and Turkmenistan, leveraging gas exports to China, do not encounter substantial difficulties. Conversely, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most susceptible Central Asian nations to China’s “Debt-trap Diplomacy.”

BACKGROUND: The concept of “Debt-trap Diplomacy” was first introduced by Indian academic Brahma Chellaney in 2017. This term describes a relatively new policy tool employed by China in connection with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The strategy involves China extending excessive loans to low-income, heavily indebted countries that are unable to repay them. Consequently, these borrowing nations are compelled to cede strategic assets to China in a debt-for-equity swap to alleviate their debt burden. Recent studies indicate that Beijing has also become a significant emergency rescue lender to these same countries, many of which are struggling to manage their debts. Between 2008 and 2021, China allocated US$ 240 billion to bail out 22 countries, predominantly those involved in Xi Jinping’s BRI. Countries such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Mongolia, Zambia, Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia have been notably impacted by China’s debt-trap policy in recent years. A prominent example of this policy is the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. The Chinese government provided a loan for the port’s development, which was carried out by Chinese contractors. When Sri Lanka failed to meet its loan repayments, China leased the port for 99 years as a form of debt repayment. This 99-year lease is strategically significant for Beijing, particularly in the context of its competition with India in the Indian Ocean. In Central Asia, statistical data indicate that with the expansion of China’s economic and commercial influence, the debt owed by countries in this region to Beijing has increased significantly. By the first half of 2023, Central Asia’s collective debt to China had reached US$ 15.7 billion, representing 7.6 percent of the region’s external debt. Kazakhstan, in particular, has accumulated a substantial amount of hidden debt. According to central bank data, as of January 1, 2024, Astana owed US$ 9.2 billion, primarily to the China Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank). However, this debt constitutes only about 3.5 percent of Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product (GDP), a figure that has remained relatively stable over the past three years. Tajikistan, on the other hand, owes an estimated US$ 3.3 billion to foreign investors, with half of this amount owed to China, equating 27 percent of its total GDP. Consequently, China is Tajikistan’s primary creditor. According to the Ministry of Finance of Tajikistan, as of early 2024, the country’s debt to China stood at US$ 900 million, which accounts for 27.8 percent of its total external debt. By the end of 2023, Uzbekistan’s debt to China amounted to US$ 3.775 billion, representing just under 13 percent of its total external debt. Notably, by 2022, the China Development Bank (CDB) held US$ 2.2 billion of this debt, making it Uzbekistan’s third-largest creditor. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, has approximately US$ 4 billion in outstanding loans to China, which constitutes around 40 percent of its total GDP. This equates to roughly US$ 700 owed to China per Kyrgyz citizen. The country’s bilateral concessional loans exceed US$ 2 billion, or 44 percent of its total debt. Of this, 36.7 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign debt is owed to the Export-Import Bank of China, amounting to US$ 1.7 billion in 2023. Akylbek Japarov, the chairman of the Kyrgyz Cabinet of Ministers, has stated that the country has reached the peak of its external debt payments. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov has expressed optimism that, if the current situation remains stable, the country’s foreign debt could be paid off by 2035. Regarding Turkmenistan, the information available is limited and unclear. The only notable instance is a statement by then-President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov on June 12, 2021, asserting that Turkmenistan had fully repaid loans provided by China for the pipeline and the first stage of the Galkynysh gas field development on time and in full.

IMPLICATIONS: Over the past two decades, China has supplanted Russia as the primary economic and trading partner of Central Asian countries. Debt-trap diplomacy plays a crucial role in solidifying this shift. The inability of Central Asian nations, particularly those with weaker economies like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, to repay their loans could result in China acquiring ownership of key infrastructure within these countries. For instance, China might gain control over the Kyrgyz thermal power plant in Bishkek, the Datka-Kemin power transmission line, and the road connecting the northern and southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. Similarly, China could potentially own and manage Tajikistan’s gold and silver mines. Consequently, the capacity of Central Asian countries, especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, to repay their debts to China holds significant and long-term strategic implications. Debt repayment can sustain China as a crucial economic and trade partner for Central Asian countries, which is vital for maintaining a balance against Russia. However, the inability to repay these loans will lead to a strong dependence on China, creating conditions similar to Russia’s relationships with Belarus and Armenia. In 2002, under the “Property for Debt” agreement between then-President of Armenia Robert Kocharian and the Russian Federation, Armenia’s inability to repay its loans resulted in the Russian government taking ownership of significant economic infrastructure, including electricity, gas, telecommunications, and railways. This process has significantly contributed to Armenia’s strong dependence on Russia. Even after two decades, despite considerable dissatisfaction with Russia, Nikol Pashinyan’s government has struggled to establish a more independent and diverse foreign policy. Similarly, debt-trap diplomacy and China’s potential ownership of infrastructure could lead to comparable outcomes for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, akin to the situation in Armenia or the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. This scenario poses a serious challenge for these small Central Asian countries in terms of “diversifying” and “balancing” their foreign policies. This challenging process has led to a rise in anti-Chinese sentiments and Sinophobia in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in recent years. Notably, in 2011, Tajikistan resolved a border dispute by ceding land, a move believed to be part of a debt relief agreement with China. Furthermore, in 2018, over 30,000 Chinese migrants, many of whom were construction workers on BRI-funded projects, arrived in Kyrgyzstan. Given this context, there are serious concerns about the negative and potentially dangerous consequences of China’s debt-trap diplomacy in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Tajik political scientist Parviz Mullojanov has warned that accumulating Chinese debt is “playing with fire,” as it could serve as a pretext for political and geopolitical expansion at any moment. However, leaders and experts close to Central Asian governments dismiss these concerns as Western propaganda against China. They argue that borrowing and repayment are part of economic interdependence in today’s world, which can foster economic growth. This perspective is reflected in signs around Tajikistan’s capital that read: “Assistance from China for a common future.” On the other hand, the lack of transparency in Chinese loan agreements, coupled with infrastructure investments, has exacerbated issues of corruption and oligarchy. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan appear to face fewer challenges and threats from China’s debt-trap diplomacy, largely due to their stable and growing economies. Additionally, Turkmenistan stands out as the only Central Asian country with a positive trade balance with China, primarily due to its gas exports. Consequently, the loans and debt to China, whose full extent remains unclear, do not pose a significant threat to Turkmenistan’s economy.

CONCLUSIONS: Over the past 22 years, China has invested US$ 105 billion in Central Asia through development finance, with the China Development Bank (CDB) playing a pivotal role in this process. “Debt-trap Diplomacy” has become a crucial tool for advancing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as it enters its second decade. During a virtual summit in January 2022, marking 30 years of diplomatic ties with Central Asian countries, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would provide US$ 500 million in aid to Central Asia over the next three years to support socially significant projects. Furthermore, in October 2023, at the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, China and Central Asian states adopted a joint action plan for developing green technology in the region. Given these developments, it is expected that China’s loan policies and debt-trap diplomacy will continue in Central Asia. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine presents an opportunity for China to further expand its economic and financial influence in the region, similar to the Ruble Crisis of 1998. However, the impact of China’s debt-trap diplomacy varies across Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan’s debt to China is considered the most manageable by regional standards. Uzbekistan, benefiting from economic growth, and Turkmenistan, with its positive trade balance due to gas exports to China, do not face significant challenges. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most vulnerable to China’s debt-trap diplomacy. If these countries are unable to repay their substantial debts to China, which constitute a significant portion of their GDP, they may face situations similar to those experienced by Sri Lanka and Armenia. This could pose serious challenges to their efforts to diversify and balance their foreign policies.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .