by Svante E. Cornell

In August 2024, the leaders of Central Asian states met in Astana, Kazakhstan, for their sixth summit since 2018. This summit – at which regional leaders further committed to deepen regional cooperation – was an important development, indicating that Central Asian states are determined not to be pawns in rising great power competition.

BACKGROUND: Since the states of Central Asia gained independence three decades ago, a key question has been whether the region’s future will be determined by the countries of the region itself, or by outside powers. The decline of international norms in recent years is a decidedly unwelcome one for Central Asian states, which find themselves at the fulcrum of great power competition on the Eurasian continent. Dividing lines became stronger around them, and the region confronts the risk of coming under the domination of an emerging axis of revisionist powers consisting of Russia, China and Iran.

In recent years, the relationship among these three revisionist powers has become stronger. The growing coordination between Russia and China has been visible for the world to see, even though their relationship in Central Asia is more complex than it seems. Similarly, there has been a steadily expanding alignment between Russia and Iran. Iran’s active support for Russia’s war in Ukraine has brought the two powers closer, and led to heightened risks that coordination between them can expand to matters relating to Central Asia and the Caucasus. China and Iran have also increased their coordination, not least in circumventing U.S. sanctions. Beyond this, there has been increasing coordination between the three revisionist powers, including joint maritime drills in the Gulf of Oman, the latest in April 2024.

The extent of the trilateral axis between Russia, China and Iran has been subject to considerable debate. Some have correctly pointed out that it remains largely rhetorical and relies mainly on three bilateral relations. Still, the axis has the potential to strengthen, particularly if the U.S.-China relationship further deteriorates and a crisis in the Taiwan straits causes Beijing to turn with renewed interest to Russia and Iran.

It is to the good fortune of Greater Central Asia that it has so far been largely spared from the direct and military intervention of these revisionist powers. Still, the emergence of this new axis changes the parameters for the region, creating new elements of vulnerability and threatening to confront it with a fait accompli of being subsumed under this new axis.

In the face of these challenges, however, Central Asian states have maintained their independent approach to the world. They have shown that they are no longer “pawns” in a “Great Game,” or at the mercy of great powers. Quite to the contrary, states in the region are developing an ability to impact the region surrounding them, gaining sufficient power to assert their own priorities – not least strengthening cooperation among each other.

IMPLICATIONS: One of the most defining developments that has made this possible is the rise of Middle Powers in Central Asia. The first state to emerge as a Middle Power is Kazakhstan, which did so through a combination of its economic strength, foreign policy strategy, and multilateral initiatives; more recently, Uzbekistan is also emerging as a Middle Power.

The concept of Middle Powers is particularly relevant to Central Asia because the region lacks a functioning collective security mechanism. This is all the more concerning because of the size differential between regional states and surrounding powers – and the fluctuating relations among those surrounding powers further contributes to instability.

This instability makes the role of Middle Powers crucial in order to anchor Central Asian security. A Middle Power has the ability to impact, to some extent, the policy of great powers and stabilize the interaction among them in its region. It can raise the situation in the region to the attention of multilateral organizations and external powers. More importantly, a Middle Power can help organize neighboring states so that otherwise smaller and weaker states can band together and pool resources.

Kazakhstan began to emerge as the first Middle Power in greater Central Asia a decade or so ago. It did so for several reasons, which include both objective attributes as well as choices its leadership made. First, Kazakhstan’s economy is by far the most developed of the region. Second, it has taken a proactive approach to developing a foreign policy to handle the competition among great powers. Third, it is taking a leading role in promoting regional cooperation. Fourth, it plays a crucial role in the connectivity of the region. Fifth, Kazakhstan has gone beyond the region with international initiatives that cemented its role. Finally, its internal reforms make its status as a Middle Power increasingly sustainable.

The August 8 summit of Central Asian leaders is an example of how Kazakhstan exercises this role as a Middle Power. Ahead of the Summit, Kazakhstani leaders had indicated their efforts to “strengthen the region’s international subjectivity,” as leaders now term their effort to build regional institutions. At the Summit, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev commented that these meetings have “given regional cooperation a systematic, comprehensive and, above all, reliable character.”

Key to this success is also the increasingly tight cooperation between Kazakhstan and Central Asia’s most populous state, Uzbekistan. With the two larger states taking the lead, Central Asia has begun to resemble the Franco-German cooperation in post-war Europe that led to the process of European Integration.

CONCLUSIONS: The rise of Middle Powers in Central Asia has considerable implications. It should lead to a fundamental rethink in many quarters about how the Greater Central Asian region should be understood. Too often, the region is still viewed in terms of a “Great Game,” where large power compete for influence, while local states are seen as helpless and possibly hopeless satrapies that lack agency of their own. 

That description of the region is now not just inaccurate but misleading. Furthermore, for external forces – be it powers such as the EU, US or Japan, or international organizations – the emergence of Middle Powers in Greater Central Asia present an important opportunity. The strategies adopted by foreign states toward the region have yet to explicitly acknowledge the emergence of Middle Powers that can serve as key partners with which foreign powers can safeguard their interests in the region.

The United States and EU both developed strategy documents toward Central Asia in the late 2010s. These strategies took a step toward acknowledging the regional states as subjects rather than objects of international relations. Events since then have largely made these strategies obsolete. As these strategies are revised, it is imperative that they reflect the new reality in the region – the emergence of Middle Powers that have considerable agency in helping shape their region for the future.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Joint Center.

By Farkhod Tolipov

On August 9-10, 2024, the Sixth Consultative Meeting of the Presidents of Central Asian states was held in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. During this meeting, a number of strategically important documents were adopted, including the “Conception of Regional Cooperation until 2040.” Expectations were high regarding the potential for new initiatives aimed at enhancing regional integration, and significant progress was indeed made. However, the pace of this process was perceived as excessively slow, with the participating presidents displaying a degree of caution. While the Conception is promising and forward-looking, it appears to lack the necessary conceptual strength to effectively guide regional cooperation.

BACKGROUND: Regional integration in Central Asia was formally declared by the five independent states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since that time, the integration process has progressed through several significant phases. However, throughout this period, these nations have contended with substantial geopolitical burdens. The admission of Russia to the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) led to the merger of the CACO with the Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzES), resulting in the dissolution of the CACO. This state of “frozen integration” persisted for nearly a decade until 2017, when the President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoev, initiated a revitalization of the integration process by proposing the establishment of Consultative Meetings (CM) of the Central Asian presidents. CMs were held in Astana in March 2018; Tashkent in November 2019; Avaza, Turkmenistan in August 2021; Cholponata, Kyrgyzstan on July 20-21, 2022, and Dushanbe in September 2023. During each CM, the presidents adopted a Joint Statement – a declarative document that, while important, primarily serves to express their unity, fraternity, and common intentions. At the fourth CM, the presidents adopted the Treaty “On Friendship, Good Neighborhood, and Cooperation for the Development of Central Asia in the 21st Century.”  This treaty, while unique, effectively complemented a collection of existing strategically significant documents, such as the Treaty “On Eternal Friendship” signed in 1997, and the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan Treaty “On Alliance Relationship” signed in December 2023. During the third CM, a Joint Statement was issued in which the presidents tasked their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs with developing the Treaty for presentation at the subsequent meeting. This task was successfully accomplished, illustrating a relatively new approach to regional decision-making: the leaders had begun to draft roadmaps and plan actions from one meeting to the next. When the presidents of Central Asia convene for their summits, Russian media consistently respond to these events by expressing geopolitical concerns regarding the “without-Russia” nature of these gatherings. While such reactions may appear ridiculous, baseless, and unfriendly, they reveal an underlying truth: Moscow is genuinely apprehensive about the potential loss of its neo-imperial influence in Central Asia, particularly in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine. The fourth CM itself and the treaty adopted during the meeting convened the impression of an inadequately slow progress of regional integration. Notably, the presidents of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have hitherto abstained from signing the Treaty “On Friendship, Good Neighborhood, and Cooperation,” and the Treaty was not even mentioned during the sixth summit.  Yet while the Treaty appears to have been forgotten, the Conception-2040 was adopted, indicating a potential shift in focus away from previous agreements toward broader strategic visions for regional cooperation.

IMPLICATIONS: The title of the Conception-2040 emphasizes cooperation rather than integration. Not only does the title overlook the notion of “integration,” but the text of the Conception itself does not mention this concept at all. This omission raises the question of whether, by 2040 – nearly half a century after gaining independence – Central Asian nations will still not be fully integrated. Moreover, by 2040, it is unlikely that the current presidents will still be in power, making it improbable that they would take political and moral responsibility for the implementation or non-implementation of the Conception. In contrast to previous CMs, this summit introduced several innovative ideas. The President of Uzbekistan proposed the establishment of a Free Trade Zone and a Common Market in Central Asia. The President of Kazakhstan suggested the re-establishment of Water-Energy and Transport Consortiums. One of the most significant ideas articulated during the summit was President Tokaev’s proposal to create a “defense and security architecture” in Central Asia and to develop a Catalog of Security Risks for the region. This proposal is indeed timely and, if realized, it would signify a genuine breakthrough in regional integration. However, three Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and two of them – Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – are also members of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Clearly, these two structures divert the Central Asian states from pursuing solely regional formats of integration. Consequently, the timely idea of establishing a regional security and defense architecture will inevitably conflict with the commitments of Central Asian states to CSTO and EAEU. Overall, the initiatives proposed during the sixth Consultative Meeting bear resemblance to the European functionalist approach to regional integration, wherein the unification process gradually extends from one sphere to another based on successful cooperation in each domain.  The recent summit fostered the impression of synchronized regional policies between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In March 2024, the leaders of these two states convened for an informal meeting in the Uzbek city of Khiva, during which they announced their intention to act in “tandem,” indicating a close and empathetic relationship. This mode of cooperation was preceded by the signing of the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan Treaty “On Alliance Relationship” in December 2022. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan signed a Treaty on Alliance Relationships in April 2024. Additionally, Kazakhstan has similar alliance treaties with both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This trend reflects the overarching direction in regional affairs within Central Asia, which is driven by a historical imperative for integration. There is now a demand for the transformation of several bilateral alliances into a cohesive regional alliance in Central Asia. This process should, in theory, facilitate the rapid institutionalization of integration within a shorter timeframe than the proposed deadline of 2040. Furthermore, the idea of forming, strengthening, and developing a “regional identity” was officially articulated for the first time during the summit. This significant notion has gained considerable relevance and academic attention and is now recognized by the leaders of the five Central Asian countries. This discourse bears resemblance to the European identity narrative, which emerged in the context of deep political and social integration. However, while the European identity is a byproduct of robust integration among European nations, the impetus for stronger integration in Central Asia is largely rooted in the pre-existing regional identity shared by the nations of the region. Thus, the sixth Consultative Meeting left an ambiguous impression. On one hand, it showcased a relatively “new thinking,” as the presidents discussed regional identity and the establishment of a regional security architecture. On the other hand, after 33 years of independence, they appeared hesitant to engage in discussions about the prospects for full integration, even extending to the year 2040.

CONCLUSIONS: The question of whether to pursue consultation or integration has become a dilemma for the presidents of Central Asia. By designating their meetings as consultations from the outset, they appear to have alleviated themselves of greater responsibility for regional affairs. This tendency may stem from a prevailing perception – the memory of the failures of integration during the 1990s and early 2000s – that continues to shape their decision-making regarding regional development. Additionally, the geopolitical landscape, characterized by Russia’s divide-and-rule policy, can further impede the momentum of this process. It is important to recognize that the evolution of integration in Central Asia is likely to encounter friction, which is inevitable in any context of international relations. However, as long as the course of regional affairs is primarily dependent on the decisions of the presidents, the potential for aberrations in the integration process will remain significant and even risky. It is evident that the overall pace of the CMs is too slow, and the leaders are overly cautious. One contributing factor to this hesitance is the absence of a conceptual vision for the future. The leaders continue to avoid discussing integration, instead opting for rhetoric centered on cooperation, which obscures and undermines the genuine goals of regional development based on a shared regional identity. Another related issue is the elitist nature of the CMs, which remain a power-centric process. It is crucial for civil society and the expert community to be actively involved in this discourse. To paraphrase a classical maxim, we might argue that integration is too important and too serious an issue to be left solely in the hands of presidents.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Research Institution “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

On September 17, 2024, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz participated in the second Germany-Central Asia Summit held in Kazakhstan. His three-day visit to the region commenced in Uzbekistan, followed by engagements in Kazakhstan, where he also held meetings with the leaders of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. At present, Germany is confronted with the necessity of refining its regional policy to effectively respond to the evolving challenges in Central Asia. While it seeks to deepen its relations with the region, the specific approach it will adopt to address these challenges remains uncertain.

BACKGROUND: Germany's interest in Central Asia has significantly increased in recent years, as evidenced by a series of high-level visits and diplomatic initiatives. In 2023, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, followed by the inaugural Germany-Central Asia Summit. These engagements have consistently emphasized the importance of strengthening ties with the region, with particular focus on Kazakhstan. With a trade volume of $4 billion, Kazakhstan plays a crucial role for Germany and is viewed as a strategic country within the Middle Corridor. Uzbekistan has recently begun to draw attention as well. Germany has also demonstrated its capacity for swift action in responding to the challenges Europe has faced since 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The increasing perception of Russia as a security threat has forced Germany, along with other European nations, to make critical decisions. Recognizing the necessity of adopting a more proactive stance, particularly in terms of military and energy policies, Germany has taken measures to address its concerns with Russia indirectly, while positioning itself as a key actor in the broader regional context. The decision to deepen relations with the Central Asian republics represents a significant development during this period. The growing consensus that Germany must adopt a more active role in the region than it has in the past is shaping the current government’s strategic approach. Alongside issues such as migration, security, energy, and the Middle Corridor, the broader challenge of regional competition has also emerged as a priority on the government’s agenda. In this context, it is essential to acknowledge that China's influence in Central Asia is as significant as Russia's. Germany has emphasized that its efforts to reduce the influence of both Russia and China in the region are undertaken on behalf of all European countries, reflecting a coordinated response to these geopolitical dynamics. During her 2022 visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock expressed this sentiment, stating: “It is important to me that the future holds more for them than merely the choice between being straitjacketed in Russia’s front yard or being dependent on China. And so my main aim in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is to listen to the hopes and expectations that people there are pinning on Europe in the current circumstances.” The German-Central Asian Summit and the recent strengthening of ties with the region have emerged as key developments in recent years. The second summit took place at a time when Chancellor Scholz indicated a more proactive approach toward Central Asia. This shift raises important questions about how Germany will manage its relations with the region, whether it will pursue a selective policy approach, and how closely its actions will align with the expectations of the international community. These factors will be critical in shaping Germany's long-term strategy and influence in Central Asia amidst a complex geopolitical environment.

IMPLICATIONS: In September 2024, Chancellor Scholz began his meetings in Uzbekistan as part of a strategy to provide regional balance. The German government described his visit as an effort "to breathe life into this regional partnership," reflecting Germany's growing interest in Uzbekistan’s increasing economic strength. During his meeting with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Scholz emphasized Germany’s firm commitment to deepening bilateral relations. The two parties signed several agreements, including those relating to the Green Central Asia Initiative and critical minerals. However, the migration agreement attracted the most attention. This deal aims to address the legal challenges faced by Uzbek citizens by facilitating the movement of skilled workers to Germany, enabling them to work in various sectors. For Uzbekistan, which had long awaited this development, the agreement marked a significant achievement in its relations with Germany. On the other hand, the German media has reported that another significant aspect of the agreement pertains to the deportation of Afghan nationals who have committed crimes in Germany. In June 2024, it was revealed that Germany would work with Uzbekistan to facilitate this process without directly engaging with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has expressed its willingness to cooperate and is expected to play a crucial role in the deportation of Afghan individuals from Germany. During the talks, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev highlighted the historical depth of bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and Germany, dating back to the 18th century, and stressed the importance of strengthening these ties in the current era. Both parties agreed to enhance cooperation in various sectors, particularly in politics, security, defense, and culture. The trade volume, which was approximately $1.3 billion in 2023, is expected to increase significantly in the near future. As a result, Uzbekistan, alongside Kazakhstan, has emerged as one of the key countries receiving special attention from Germany. After Uzbekistan, Scholz visited Kazakhstan, where the summit was to take place, signaling Germany’s new Central Asia policy. Scholz gave a statement highlighting Central Asia’s importance: “We want to continue and further intensify this... Especially in times of global uncertainty, we need close, trusting international partners.” Chancellor Scholz's remarks indirectly referenced the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting instability. Since early 2022, the war has brought significant disruption to Europe, leading to negative consequences that have directly and indirectly affected Germany. Issues ranging from energy security to the defense of the European Union's borders have highlighted Russia's continuing presence as a multifaceted threat, contributing to what Scholz has referred to as "global uncertainty." Central Asia, once regarded by Russia as its "near abroad," has now been redefined by Germany as a region of "trustworthy partners." Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who hosted the summit, outlined six key areas of cooperation with Germany. He emphasized the importance of increasing trade volume and called for collaboration in energy, industry, transport, water resource management, and efforts toward global peace. Central Asian countries view their relations with Germany as a strategic opportunity to attract technical and technological investments while leveraging Germany as a gateway to strengthen ties with the broader European Union. Consequently, the recent meeting underscored a strong interest in Germany's technical expertise. Proposals were put forward to further develop the Middle Corridor and to involve Germany in the Green Energy Line project connecting Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. Additionally, both sides expressed interest in expanding cooperation on hydrogen energy to encompass the entire European Union. In the broader context of regional affairs, the European Union's Global Gateway strategy remains crucial. This initiative, which has received praise from President Tokayev, is valued for its role in enhancing transport connectivity between Central Asia and the EU. However, Germany’s Central Asia policy is now facing growing pressure and heightened expectations from multiple stakeholders. Many media outlets and academics interpret the Global Gateway as a competitive response to China's influence in the region, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative, which has been active since 2013. China's role has faced criticism from various perspectives, leading to increasing calls for Western-centered initiatives. As a key player, Germany is expected to promote policies that advance European strategies across different regions. Nevertheless, the long-term advantages of a regional strategy focused on competing with China remain uncertain for Germany, raising questions about the sustainability and impact of such an approach. International organizations have increasingly urged Germany to adopt a more proactive stance on human rights issues in Central Asia. Human Rights Watch, for example, has called on Germany to address persistent challenges in the region. However, the long-term impact of Germany’s involvement in sensitive matters such as human rights abuses, ethnic conflicts, authoritarian regimes, and non-transparent elections remains uncertain. Scholz has expressed doubt about Germany’s ability to take a leading role on these issues at this time. How Germany navigates these concerns will significantly influence its position within Europe and its reputation as a reliable partner in Central Asia. Afghanistan, on the other hand, continues to pose a major challenge for Germany. Scholz has condemned the Taliban’s rise to power as “illegitimate” and described the situation in Afghanistan as "depressing." However, his stance has been interpreted in varying ways by countries in the region. While Germany can adopt a more selective approach to its relations with Afghanistan, Central Asian states do not have the same flexibility due to their geographical and political proximity. As a result, Germany's attempts to influence the policies of regional countries concerning Afghanistan could lead to unintended negative consequences. Germany's involvement in the regional strategies of Afghanistan's neighbors—such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—could potentially create tensions and adverse repercussions, complicating its broader Central Asian policy.

CONCLUSIONS: Germany now stands at a critical juncture, facing important decisions regarding its role in Central Asia. The country has the opportunity to establish a solid presence in the region by adopting a win-win strategy, leveraging its technical expertise, and fostering collaborative relationships with Central Asian countries. Conversely, Germany could also choose to act as an indirect pressure mechanism by criticizing, commenting on, or interfering in the internal affairs of these nations, potentially limiting its influence and creating friction within the region. The way Central Asian republics perceive the notion of "trustworthy partners" will become clearer over time as these dynamics unfold. Although the ambitious rhetoric of leaders like Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and Chancellor Scholz may initially seem promising for Germany and Europe, any negative consequences arising from the region’s complex realities could be viewed as a political failure for the German government. In this context, it would be more prudent for Germany to align its policies with the expectations of the Central Asian republics. Rather than taking a top-down approach, policies should be crafted on an equal footing, emphasizing mutual respect and shared interests to ensure a sustainable and constructive partnership.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Assistant Professor at Joongbu University and Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He studied and worked in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Seoul as academic and journalist. He is the author of numerous articles and books on South Caucasus and Central Asian affairs.